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I. ASPIRATION AND REALITY
Modern American civil procedure seeks to be clear, fair, and rational. The
goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the centerpiece of modern
procedural reform, was to eliminate arcane technicalities and get to the
substantive issues. Consequently, the original drafters sought to streamline
pleading, ensure the presence of properly interested parties, gather all the
relevant facts, and enable courts to make well-founded decisions on the
merits.1
As everyone now knows, the drafters did not quite accomplish their
loftiest goal of making federal litigation “just, speedy, and inexpensive.”2
Ambiguities appeared in the rules, lawyers proved imaginative in exploiting
them, interpretive complexities arose, and the gathering of facts proved ever
more frustrating and burdensome. Expanding waves of cases began streaming
into the courts during the second half of the twentieth century, and a socalled “litigation explosion” generated growing pressures for courts to dispose
of ever larger numbers of cases with greater efficiency, less discovery, and
more dispositions without trial.3
Those changes prompted an escalating battle over procedural reform that
highlighted the underlying truth challenging efforts to create a clear, fair, and
rational procedural system. It is pointless, we learned, to consider procedural

1 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure differ drastically from the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and evidence suggests that unlike the civil rules, the criminal rules were shaped with
racist goals and outcomes in mind. For detailed discussions of this history, see generally Ion Meyn,
Constructing Separate and Unequal Courtrooms, 63 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2021) (describing how race was
interwoven into early promulgations of criminal procedure); Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal
Procedure Are So Different: A Forgotten History, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 697 (2017) (noting that
the need for different procedural rules governing civil and criminal proceedings is “historically
contingent”).
2 The announced purpose of the Federal Rules was “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding” and remains as such. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Stephen
Burbank, of course, wrote one of the classic studies of the origins and goals of the Rules Enabling
Act that authorized the Federal Rules. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
3 See generally WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED
WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991) (describing how the time when Americans
began to turn to litigation more frequently, dubbed the “litigation explosion,” altered the U.S. legal
system). But see Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 982, 990-96 (2003) (challenging the nature and significance of a civil “litigation explosion”).
In several areas, including the scope of federal question jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
effectuated its policy of restricting the federal caseload where possible. See, e.g., Empire Healthchoice
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006) (refusing to extend federal question jurisdiction
over suits brought by insurers against beneficiaries to coup medical expenses under the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 264-65 (2013) (refusing to
deprive the state court of jurisdiction over a malpractice case relating to patent law).
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rules abstractly and to judge them only by their purported “simplicity,”
“rationality,” and “fairness.” Proceduralists have increasingly recognized that
they can never know the actual significance of any procedural rule—however
fair and rational it might appear on its face—without empirical evidence
showing its uses and practical results.
Changes occur in the interpretation of procedural rules, the impact they
have on one another, the social contexts in which they operate, the nature of
the parties who use them, and the practical results the parties seek to achieve.4
The jurisdictional amount for federal diversity jurisdiction, for example, now
an almost trivial matter, was for more than half a century one of the most
significant economically distributive rules in the American legal system.5
Similarly, as Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang have explained, Rule 68 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was designed as a neutral, efficiencyseeking provision meant to encourage settlements, yet it evolved into a tool
that defendants used to undermine fee-shifting statutes that Congress had
enacted to aid plaintiffs.6 Now it is a recognized truism that procedural
analysis must focus on the way that rules operate in practice and how they
serve—or disserve—different social groups and interests.7
II. ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVES
Stephen Burbank has long urged the necessity of empirical studies of civil
procedure, and his numerous substantial contributions to the field together
4 A recent book by scholar Amalia D. Kessler argues that many of the most basic procedural
assumptions that undergird America’s adversarial legal system were developed to establish the
professional authority of the lawyer class. AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800–1877, at
152-57, 198-99, 235, 265, 323 (2017). Further, the book also argues that some of those assumptions
were rooted in racist, nativist, and anti-Catholic biases. Id. at 6-7, 13-15, 235, 265, 311-16, 322.
5 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 97-102 (1992) (“[T]he jurisdictional amount
served as a distributive economic force that impinged seriously on individual plaintiffs [suing outof-state corporations].”).
6 STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 35, 103-08, 132-35 (2017) [hereinafter
BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT].
7 See, e.g., Suzette Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Its Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455, 464 (2017) (“It
is well established that the Rules have a disproportionate adverse effect on certain substantive areas
of law and kinds of cases.”). Such empirical analyses are particularly necessary now with COVID-19
and the advent of hearings and oral arguments on Zoom and by telephone, technical developments
that will surely change the practice of law and likely bring additional kinds of socially differential
consequences. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Covid & the Courts, N.Y. REV., May 28, 2020, at 10 (discussing
technological challenges associated with addressing applications from incarcerated prisoners seeking
permanent or temporary release due to risks of continued confinement associated with the
pandemic).
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with those of many other scholars have shown the value and necessity of such
work.8 Increasingly sophisticated statistical analyses of caseloads and judicial
decisionmaking have been quite revealing, while the varied research of
historians, political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists have all
deepened our understanding of the complex and changing role that
procedural rules play in the American legal system. They have demonstrated
that social factors of all kinds—political, cultural, economic, religious, and
ideological—shape both the content and interpretation of procedural rules as
well as the ways in which diverse parties use these rules to achieve their
desired results. A staggering variety of extralegal social factors can influence
and determine the outcome of even the simplest case.9
Drawing on insights from social psychology, for example, Neal Devins
and Lawrence Baum recently advanced a new theory of Supreme Court
decisionmaking. They stress the importance not simply of recognized
influences on the justices, such as judicial policy preferences and changes in
public opinion, but of an additional factor: the informing role of the “elite
social networks that the Justices are a part of.”10 Relying on a “psychological
model” of judicial behavior, they argue that judges are acutely sensitive to the
views and values of other elites, especially to the relatively cohesive networks
of opposed elites that gather together in such activist ideological
organizations as the conservative Federalist Society and the liberal American
Constitution Society. The Federalist Society seemed particularly significant
to them because it has become a de facto judicial employment agency for
Republican administrations.11 All five Republican justices serving on the
Court when Devins and Baum wrote had connections with the society, and
four of the five were actively involved in the society’s events.12
8 E.g., BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 6, at 130-81
(conducting empirical analyses “to model the relationship between justices’ ideological preferences
and their votes on private enforcement issues”); Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary
Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 591, 604 (2004) [hereinafter Burbank, Vanishing Trials] (“Both my own empirical work and
that of many other scholars long ago persuaded me that the picture of a legal landscape that emerges
from published opinions, at whatever court level, is very probably distorted . . . .”). It is essential,
he reiterated, to recognize the undeniable fact that “the law in the books is not a reliable guide to
the law in action.” Id.
9 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Democracy, the Constitution, and Legal Positivism in America: Lessons
From a Winding and Troubled History, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1457, 1504-07 (2014) (providing examples of
these social factors).
10 NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN
DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 10 (2019).
11 Id. at 121-28.
12 Id. at xi. The sixth and most recent Republican appointee to the Court, Justice Amy Coney
Barrett, also maintained connections with the Federalist Society. See Elizabeth Dias, Rebecca R.
Ruiz & Sharon LaFraniere, Rooted in Faith, Amy Coney Barrett Represents a New Conservatism, N.Y.
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The Devins and Baum study suggests more broadly the potential value of
drawing on social psychology and other similar fields, such as anthropology
and media studies, in an effort to better understand how and why judges and
scholars interpret legal rules as they do. Such broadened approaches raise
fascinating and exceptionally complex questions. To what extent, for example,
do the views and values of individuals fuse with the cultural and ideological
views of the groups they join and influence the way they interpret and apply
procedural rules?13 Again, to what extent do broader social and cultural
patterns of belief explain interpretive differences in the way judges construe
procedural rules and apply them in different social contexts?
Legal scholars, of course, are well aware of the danger of relying too
heavily on social science theories, perhaps psychological ones especially.
Those theories have often changed over time and subsequently been targeted
for harsh criticisms by later generations.14 Thus, it is always prudent to use
such explanatory theories with great care and, above all, to stay close to both
the applicable formal law and established social facts.
With that caution in mind, I suggest three propositions in advancing an
alternate approach to the study of civil procedure that employs the
psychological theory of “implicit bias.”15 Specifically, I suggest the following
three hypotheses:
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/11/us/politics/amy-coney-barrett-life-career-family.html
[https://perma.cc/J8Q7-C4QA] (last updated Mar. 4, 2021).
13 See generally, e.g., William B. Swann, Jr., Jolanda Jetten, Ángel Gómez, Harvey Whitehouse
& Brock Bastian, When Group Membership Gets Personal: A Theory of Identity Fusion, 119 PSYCH. REV.
441 (2012) (exploring possible causes of identity fusion); Marc Howard Ross, Culture and Identity in
Comparative Political Analysis, in CULTURE AND POLITICS: A READER 39-70 (Lane Crothers &
Charles Lockhart eds., 2000) (discussing contemporary political culture theory); Ann Swidler,
Cultural Power and Social Movements, CULTURE AND POLITICS: A READER 269-83 (Lane Crothers
& Charles Lockhart eds., 2000) (same); Joe Henrich & Robert Boyd, The Evolution of Conformist
Transmission and the Emergence of Between-Group Differences, 19 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 215,
225-30 (1998) (investigating the evolution of “conformist transmission”); Harry C. Triandis, The Self
and Social Behavior in Differing Cultural Contexts, 96 PSYCH. REV. 506 (1989) (analyzing individualismcollectivism, tightness-looseness, and cultural complexity in relation to the sampling of self, public,
and collective aspects of the self).
14 For example, psychological theories addressing “consciousness,” “responsibility,” “insanity,”
and “free will” have informed much of American law, but over time those theories evolved and earlier
ones were often discarded. See generally, e.g., SUSANNA L. BLUMENTHAL, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND: CONSCIOUSNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE 2 (2016)
(evaluating “the problematic relationship between consciousness and liability in the history of
American law . . . .”); THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, FREEDOM AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1 (2015) (discussing the “free will problem” in the context of criminal
law); JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA xv (1993) (noting connections between developments in the medical field and
American jurisprudence).
15 Some scholars have already begun to explore this idea in different procedural areas. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Thornburg, (Un)Conscious Judging, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567, 1626-31 (2019)
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1. An understanding of implicit bias and a recognition of its influence may
help illuminate the content, interpretation, and application of procedural
rules.
2. Implicit bias is especially likely to be influential when procedural rules
are applied to issues involving or implicating race, especially issues involving
Black Americans.16
3. Implicit racial bias can influence both individuals (especially in areas
where they are exercising discretion) as well as institutional groups, including
the judiciary (in the organized practices that judges develop and the standard
interpretations they accept).17
Social scientists have methodically studied implicit bias and demonstrated
its widespread presence among Americans through a variety of tests and
experiments. Central to their results is the finding that, as a general matter,
white people have negative associations with Black people and often act or
react on the basis of unrecognized and often deeply ingrained negative
feelings and stereotypes. This pattern has revealed itself even among those
consciously committed to racial equality and sincerely convinced that they
themselves harbor no racial prejudice.18 While there is an extensive literature
(discussing experimental studies assessing implicit bias among judges); Malveaux, supra note 7, at
468 (“Case outcomes may reflect, not legal standards, but variances in personal perceptions.”);
Danielle R. Holley, Narrative Highground: The Failure of Intervention as a Procedural Device in
Affirmative Action Litigation, 53 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 103, 107 (2003) (arguing that Rule 24 fails
as a procedural device because courts regard “intervenors as outsiders in the framework of litigation
. . . .”); Michael Z. Green, Reconsidering Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution for Black Work
Matters, 70 SMU L. REV. 639, 655 (2017) (“[M]ediation involves telling a story, and the way stories
get communicated may perpetrate cultural myths that operate to the disadvantage of a black
employee . . . .”).
16 Racial, ethnic, religious, gender, and sexual biases in America are exceptionally complex, and
this hypothesis could be profitably applied to explore implicit (and explicit) biases that may exist in
the legal treatment of many other categories of groups.
17 My consideration of implicit bias assumes (1) that current legal and institutional rules are
formally race-neutral, (2) that beyond the realm of legal formalities, racial biases—implicit and
explicit—may affect law and legal processes in various ways, and (3) that implicit bias may exist and
influence law and legal processes even in the absence of overt, express, conscious, or purposeful
racial bias. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Action Was Outside the Courts: Consumer Injuries and the Uses of
Contract in the United States, 1875–1945 (giving examples of the way that corporate claims agents
exploited race and gender in arranging relatively low out-of-court tort settlements), in PRIVATE
LAW AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE: COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES IN
BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMAN, AND THE UNITED STATES 522-26 (Willibald Steinmetz ed., 2000)
18 “[O]ur results are also consistent with aversive racism theory which proposes that many
Caucasians can simultaneously hold conscious egalitarian attitudes and unconscious negative
feelings and beliefs about African Americans.” Scott A. Ottaway, Davis C. Hayden & Mark A.
Oakes, Implicit Attitudes and Racism: Effects of Word Familiarity and Frequency on the Implicit Association
Test, 19 SOC. COGNITION 97, 133-34 (2001). Other studies have reached similar conclusions. See
generally, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald, T. Andrew Poehlman, Eric Luis Uhlmann & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 17 (2009); Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The
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evaluating and critiquing various implicit bias tests,19 virtually no scholar or
social scientist denies the existence and potential significance of implicit
biases on human behavior, especially those involving racial interactions. One
study, for example, found that such biases among schoolteachers led to racial
disparities in school discipline,20 while numerous studies have shown the
significant influence of implicit racial bias on medical doctors in the disparate
treatments they give their patients.21
Understandably, social scientists studying implicit bias have turned their
attention to legal issues and institutions. One study of jurors, for example,
showed that implicit racial bias influenced determinations about who should
suffer the death penalty and who should not. Examining data on Black people
convicted of capital crimes in Philadelphia from 1979 to 1999, researchers
“found a huge stereotypicality effect. Of the men rated low in stereotypical
[Black racial] features, only 24 percent were sentenced to death. But more

Development of Implicit Attitudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations From Ages 6 and 10 and Adulthood, 17
PSYCH. SCI. 53 (2006); Nilanjana Dasgupta, Debbie E. McGhee, Anthony G. Greenwald &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic Preference for White Americans: Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation,
36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 316 (2000); Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee &
Jordan L. K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association
Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1464 (1998); Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges,
Employment Discrimination: The Role of Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial Bias, 90
J. APPLIED PSYCH. 553 (2005). See also John T. Jost, Laurie A. Rudman, Irene V. Blair, Dana R.
Carney, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Jack Glaser, Curtis D. Hardin, The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond
Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of
Ten Studies That No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RSCH. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 47 tbl.1 (2009)
(outlining ten recent studies demonstrating implicit bias with respect to race, ethnicity, gender, and
social class).
19 For examples of such critiques, see Olivia Goldhill, The World Is Relying on a Flawed
Psychological Test to Fight Racism, QUARTZ (Dec. 3, 2017), https://qz.com/1144504/the-world-is-relyingon-a-flawed-psychological-test-to-fight-racism [https://perma.cc/9THG-4K2H] (arguing that the
most widely used test for implicit bias “has repeatedly fallen short of basic scientific standards”);
Frederick L. Oswald, Gregory Mitchell, Hart Blanton, James Jaccard & Philip E. Tetlock, Predicting
Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: A Meta-Analysis of IAT Criterion Studies, 105 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 171, 188 (2013) (“[Implicit bias tests] provide[] little insight into who will discriminate
against whom, and provides no more insight than explicit measures of bias.”).
20 Jason A. Okonofua & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Two Strikes: Race and the Disciplining of Young
Students, 26 J. PSYCH. SCI. 617, 622 (2015) (“We have shown experimentally . . . that teacher
responses can contribute to racial disparities in discipline.”).
21 See, e.g., Janice A. Sabin, Brian A. Nosek, Anthony G. Greenwald & Frederick P. Rivara,
Physicians’ Implicit and Explicit Attitudes About Race by MD Race, Ethnicity, and Gender, 20 J. HEALTH
CARE FOR THE POOR & UNDERSERVED 896, 907 (2009) (“[I]mplicit attitudes and stereotypes []
may represent one more form of error in medical decision-making.”); Alexander R. Green, Dana R.
Carney, Daniel J. Pallin, Long H. Ngo, Kristal L. Raymond, Lisa I Iezzoni & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22
SOC’Y GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1231 (2007) (“As physicians’ prowhite implicit bias increased, so
did their likelihood of treating white patients and not treating black patients with thrombolysis . . . .”).
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than 57 percent of the ‘highly stereotypical’ Black defendants were sentenced
to die for their crimes.”22
That finding “takes implicit bias to a whole other level,” explained Jennifer
L. Eberhardt, a social psychologist at Stanford University who specializes in
bias training for police departments.23 That “other level” showed that “an
individual’s physical appearance triggers the sort of pernicious stereotypes
that suggest that blacks are inherently so dangerous they deserve
extermination.”24 That finding was “a sign,” Eberhardt concluded, “that our
perspectives, our criminal justice process, and our institutions are still
influenced by primitive racial narratives and imagery.”25 In the 1950s and
1960s, for example, the Los Angeles Police Department readily and regularly
enforced morals offenses against black women because its officers identified
“sexual deviance with blackness.”26
Legal scholars have drawn on findings about implicit bias to examine a
variety of specific issues and areas.27 They have found evidence, for example,
22 JENNIFER L. EBERHARDT, BIASED: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE THAT
SHAPES WHAT WE SEE, THINK, AND DO 129-30 (2019).
23 Id. at 130.
24 Id.
25 Id. Accord, e.g., Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice
and the Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCH. SCI. 640, 643 (2003) (finding that a sample of European
Americans more readily perceived threating affect in Black faces than in White faces). One
commentator summarized the results of such studies by noting that “[b]y adulthood . . . most
Americans have been exposed to a culture with enough negative messages about African-Americans
and other marginalized groups that as much as 80 percent of white Americans hold unconscious bias
against black Americans.” ISABEL WILKERSON, CASTE: THE ORIGINS OF OUR DISCONTENTS 186
(2020). That bias was “so automatic that it kick[ed] in before a person [could] process it . . . .” Id.
26 Anne Gray Fischer, “Land of the White Hunter”: Legal Liberalism and the Racial Politics of
Morals Enforcement in Midcentury Los Angeles, 105 J. AM. HIST. 868, 871 (2019).
27 For a path-breaking early work, see Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 318-23 (1987) (reconsidering the
discriminatory purpose doctrine established by Washington v. Davis and arguing for removal of the
intentional motivation requirement); for a general overview, see, for example, Jerry Kang & Kristin
Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010)
(summarizing empirical evidence rejecting colorblindness and arguing for law to reflect the existence
of implicit bias). For specific studies on the role of implicit bias in the legal system, see generally
Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263 (2016); Cynthia
Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L.
REV. 1555 (2013); Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study Of Iqbal’s
Effect On Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011); Justin D. Levinson &
Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous
Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307 (2010); Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty
By Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187
(2010); Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems
of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 149 (2010); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie,
Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Justin D.
Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J.
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that in the federal courts implicit biases might be disadvantaging both women
who bring gender discrimination claims and Black people who bring racial
discrimination claims.28 As a general matter, they point out, the courts have
paid insufficient attention to the possible impact of such biases on judicial
reasoning and decisionmaking.29 Theories of implicit and institutional bias
cut especially deep when they attempt to address issues of judicial reasoning
and decisionmaking, and scholars have sought to identify what role race—as
well as class, gender, ethnicity, ideology, sexual orientation, and party
affiliation—might play in that decisionmaking.30
To begin with, it is fair to say that virtually no one speaking seriously
would agree with the discredited mechanical claim that judges merely “call
balls and strikes.”31 A substantial and well-known body of work, to which
Stephen Burbank and his colleague Sean Farhang have contributed
345 (2007); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006);
Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort,
Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269 (1994); Tanya K. Hernandez, Bias Crimes:
Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of Racially Motivated Violence, 99 YALE L.J. 845 (1990).
28 See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis
of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1129-35 (2009) (on race and gender); Elizabeth
M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS
L. REV. 705, 705 (2007) (on gender); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in
Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 890 (2006) (on race). See generally Judith Resnik, Asking
about Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952 (1996) (on gender); Judith Resnik, Gender Bias From Classes to
Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195 (1993) (on gender).
29 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 479 (2007) (responding to critics of implicit bias and arguing that the “case
for using the law to respond to the problem of implicit bias remains strong”); Samuel R. Bagenstos,
The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (arguing
that, despite its limitations, “a structural approach to employment discrimination law may be the
best hope” to address inequalities caused by unconscious bias and the “boundaryless workplace”);
Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law:
Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1007 (2006) (applying the methods of
behavioral realism in the law “to the problem of defining and identifying discriminatory motivation
in Title VII individual disparate treatment cases.”).
30 For an excellent study of the influence of racial assumptions, as well as other social
assumptions, in judicial decisionmaking, see Reginald Oh & Thomas Ross, Judicial Opinions as Racial
Narratives: The Story of Richmond v. Croson, in RACE LAW STORIES 381-417 (Rachel F. Moran &
Devon Wayne Carbado eds., 2008). For a study on various kinds of racial bias in the courtroom, see
Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel
Godsil, Anothy G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom,
59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1126-27 (2012).
31 That judicial automaton theory occasionally reappears for rhetorical effect. Confirmation
Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109 Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts).
The baseball analogy is misleading and its implication of “objectivity” unwarranted. As any baseball
fan knows, calling “balls and strikes” often involves exceptionally close and highly contestable
subjective judgments, and its practice also shows that different individual umpires have different
“strike zones.”
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significantly, demonstrates the complex influence of political ideology and
other social factors on the work of the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts.32 Further, while studies on the specific impact of race and gender on
judges are fewer and their conclusions often qualified,33 evidence suggests
that in at least some legal areas judges’ race and gender have influenced, and
possibly determined, their decisionmaking.34
In suggesting that the analysis of procedural rules should include inquiries
into possible implicit and institutional racial biases in the courts, I follow the
astute suggestion that Stephen Burbank and his good friend Stephen Subrin,

32 On the Supreme Court, Burbank and Farhang have pointed out that “the growing role of
ideology is distinctive and palpable.” Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the
Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1529 (2017). Other scholars have
arrived at a similar conclusion. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, IDEOLOGY IN THE SUPREME COURT
xiii (2017); LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 8 (2013);
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 110-14 (2002); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American
Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999); Jonathan P Kastellec, Panel Composition and
Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals over Time, 64 POL. RSCH. Q. 377, 377 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein,
David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 302 (2004); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE
L.J. 2155, 2155-56 (1998).
33 See Jonah B. Gelbach, Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics: The Life of the Parties, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 1663, 1676 n.37 (2014) (surveying the literature on the link between judges’ ideology
and decisionmaking). One early study, for example, found little difference between Black and white
judges but some moderate differences between male and female judges. Thomas G. Walker &
Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL.
596, 613-14 (1985). Another found that the race and gender of the judicial appointees of President
Bill Clinton made no significant difference in their decisionmaking. Jennifer A. Segal, Representative
Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton’s District Court Appointees, 53 POL. RSCH. Q. 137, 147-48
(2000). A third found little difference in civil case outcomes decided by judges appointed by
presidents of different parties. Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics
and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 27778 (1995).
34 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Politics, Identity, and Class Certification on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 119 MICH. L. REV. 231, 237 (2020) (finding that the presence of a single African
American on an appellate panel increases the likelihood that the panel will find in favor of class
certification); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 30-34 (2008) (finding race influential in explaining decisions under the Voting Rights Act of 1965);
Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging,
54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 406-07 (2010) (observing that male judges are less favorable than female
judges to plaintiffs in gender discrimination cases); Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA
Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1585-86 (2008) (finding that Republican
male and female judges differ in construing the Class Action Fairness Act); Christina L. Boyd, She’ll
Settle It?, 1 J.L. & COURTS 193, 211-213 (2013) (finding that female judges secure settlements more
commonly and more quickly than male judges); see generally Symposium, Feminist Jurisprudence and
Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139 (1993) (highlighting various articles that review the influence of
gender on judicial decision-making across several legal areas).
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another distinguished civil procedure scholar, made about the need for reform
in the rules allowing pretrial dismissals,35 especially those involving summary
judgment. The goal, Burbank and Subrin explained, should be to prevent “ad
hoc judgments that often appear arbitrary because of the amorphous nature
of what constitutes an evidentiary foundation sufficient to support a jury
finding.”36 Empirical studies confirm that “a supposedly uniform rule”
operates in a “radically different fashion in different parts of the country and
in different categories of cases” and that in some cases the “application of the
rule has unfairly deprived litigants (usually plaintiffs) of a trial by jury or a
trial in open court.”37
More specifically, I follow their compelling conclusion that working
toward such procedural reform requires inquiry into “the minds and hearts—
the attitudes” of everyone, including judges.38
III. IMPLICIT AND INSTITUTIONAL RACIAL BIAS IN AMERICAN
PROCEDURAL LAW: THREE VARIATIONS
If implicit and institutional racial biases influence American procedural
law, they would lie deeply buried in court practices, assumptions, and
reasoning processes. Except in extraordinary cases, they would surely be
masked by legal formalities that would make them exceptionally difficult to
identify and bring to light. Still, compelling social science findings suggest
that implicit biases exist widely and commonly, especially in racial matters,
and hence it seems likely that those biases would also intrude at least on some
occasions into the procedural rulings of the courts. An exploration of three
modern and well-known cases from three different procedural areas lends
support to that hypothesis.

35 Burbank has also criticized two Supreme Court decisions, Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic
v. Twombly, interpreting the Rule 8 pleading standard that encourages pretrial dismissal of many
civil cases before discovery. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing
before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 8 (2009) (statement of Stephen B.
Burbank).
36 Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 399, 413 (2011).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 412. Justice Sonia Sotomayor has suggested something similar and was criticized for
doing so. See Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002) (“I
would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than
not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.”).
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A. Dismissal for Lack of Standing: Implicit Racial Assumptions in Allen v.
Wright
In Allen v. Wright,39 parents of Black school children brought a nationwide
class action challenging the standards and procedures that the Internal
Revenue Service (I.R.S.) used to carry out its duty to deny tax–exempt status
to private schools that engaged in unlawful racial discrimination. The parents
claimed that the existing I.R.S. guidelines were ineffective and allowed many
private schools to hold tax–exempt status while continuing to engage in such
racial discrimination. They requested an injunction ordering the I.R.S. to adopt
new guidelines that would be more effective in curbing these discriminatory
practices. Quoting from plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court explained that the
injunction the parents sought would require the I.R.S.
to deny tax-exempt status to all private schools which have insubstantial or
nonexistent minority enrollments, which are located in or serve
desegregating public school districts, and which either—
(1) were established or expanded at or about the time the public school
districts in which they are located or which they serve were desegregating;
(2) have been determined in adversary judicial or administrative proceedings
to be racially segregated; or
(3) cannot demonstrate that they do not provide racially segregated
educational opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in
desegregating public school systems . . . .40

A five-Justice majority dismissed the complaint on the ground that
plaintiffs lacked standing. To maintain their suit, the majority explained,
plaintiffs were required to meet a three-pronged standing test. They “must
allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful
conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”41
Although the Court dismissed the first injury plaintiffs alleged as
insufficient,42 it recognized that the second one met the “injury” requirement.
468 U.S. 737 (1984).
Id. at 747 (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 751 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for the Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
42 The first injury that plaintiffs alleged, one the Court characterized as “stigmatic,” was that
the Black parents and children “are harmed directly by the mere fact of Government financial aid to
discriminatory private schools.” Id. at 752. The Court held that the injury was not sufficiently
personal and concrete to constitute a judicially cognizable injury even though it acknowledged that
such a “stigmatizing injury [is] often caused by racial discrimination” and that “this sort of
noneconomic injury is one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government action.”
Id. at 755. It noted, however, that such a “stigmatic” injury was judicially remediable only “to the
39
40
41
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That injury—“their children’s diminished ability to receive an education in a
racially integrated school”—was not only sufficient, the Court declared, but
it was “one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal system.”43 That
injury, however, failed to satisfy the second prong of the standing test. It was
“not fairly traceable to the Government conduct [plaintiffs] challenge as
unlawful.”44 Plaintiffs, therefore, lacked standing and were out of court.
The majority explained its conclusion on the “fairly traceable” prong at
length. “The line of causation” between the I.R.S. regulations and the
discriminatory nature of defendants’ schools was “attenuated at best.”45 It was
uncertain whether there were enough “discriminatory private schools” to
make “an appreciable difference in public school integration” and equally
“uncertain how many racially discriminatory private schools [were] in fact
receiving tax exemptions.”46 Most centrally, the Court focused on the
contention that the causal connection was too “attenuated” and “indirect”
because plaintiffs’ alleged injury resulted not from the I.R.S. regulation, but
“from the independent action” of innumerable third parties “not before the
court.”47 According to the majority,
It is just as speculative whether any given parent of a child attending such a
private school would decide to transfer the child to public school as a result
of any changes in educational or financial policy made by the private school
once it was threatened with loss of tax-exempt status. It is also pure
speculation whether, in a particular community, a large enough number of the
numerous relevant school officials and parents would reach decisions that
collectively would have a significant impact on the racial composition of the
public schools.48

Justices Brennan and Stevens issued separate dissents challenging the
majority’s causal reasoning. While Brennan invoked “common sense”
economic reasoning,49 Stevens elaborated on the more technical grounds of
extent that [the Black parents and children] are personally subject to discriminatory treatment.” Id.
at 757 n.22. A “stigmatic” racial injury, in other words—however common and “serious”—was by
itself insufficient to merit standing and the attention of a federal court.
43 Id. at 756.
44 Id. at 757.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 758. Because the Court was ruling on a motion to dismiss rather than on a motion for
summary judgment, its reliance on such factual uncertainty was out of place. Id. at 748 (explaining
the procedural posture of the case). At that time, plaintiffs were not required to produce factual
evidence to prove their allegations on a motion to dismiss. Justice Brennan made that point in his
dissent. Id. at 766, 767 n.1, 774-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 757 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976)) (internal
quotations omitted).
48 Id. at 758.
49 Id. at 774 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tax–policy analysis and orthodox economic theory. Tax–policy analysis
identifies tax exemptions with direct government subsidies because such
exemptions constitute “tax expenditures,” that is, tax “refunds” intended to
encourage selected activities by making them less expensive. That policy
analysis, Stevens explained, was based on “nothing more than a restatement
of elementary economics: when something becomes more expensive, less of
it will be purchased.”50 Without their tax–exempt status, discriminatory
private schools would become more expensive and, in many cases, too costly
“for parents seeking ‘a racially segregated alternative’ to public schools.”51 The
basic “laws of economics,” he continued, meant that eliminating the tax–
exempt status of discriminatory private schools would change the “incentive
structure” for “white parents” and pressure discriminatory private schools to
alter or abandon their unlawful admission policies.52 Thus, Stevens argued,
there was a sufficiently close causal connection between the overly lax
implementation of the I.R.S. regulation and the successful spread and
operation of the discriminatory private schools, a causal connection that
injured Black children by reducing their opportunity to receive an education
in a racially integrated public school.53
Two aspects of the majority’s reasoning in Allen illustrate the existence
and influence of implicit and institutional racial bias. The first concerns the
Court’s causal analysis. The majority declared that it was “pure speculation”
that a broader denial of tax–exempt status to discriminatory private schools
would cause parents and schools to change their behavior. If fewer tax
exemptions and consequent higher costs would not likely “make an
appreciable difference in public school integration,”54 why would that possibly
be true? Why would many parents and schools knowingly and purposely
embrace higher costs instead of reducing or abandoning their discriminatory
behavior? The answer could only be that their behavior was not driven by
economic incentives but rather by other and quite powerful social motives.
Those motives were racial: the desire to avoid having white children go to
school with Black children. The behavior of the parents and schools, in other
words, was shaped largely, if not wholly, by racially biased assumptions and
motives. By adopting a causal analysis that implicitly accepted the obviously
race–motivated behavior of white parents and private school officials, the
Court was essentially crediting and giving legal sanction to their racist
attitudes and values.
Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Given that causal connection, Stevens maintained, plaintiffs’ “injury can be fairly traced to
the subsidy for purposes of standing analysis.” Id. at 786.
54 Id. at 758.
50
51
52
53
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That conclusion is particularly compelling when the Court’s causal
reasoning in Allen is compared to its causal reasoning in a case decided only
four years later. In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,55 the Court found that a
direct causal relationship existed between the imposition of tort liability on a
federal government contractor and the economic position of the United
States. “The imposition of liability on Government contractors will directly
affect the terms of Government contracts: either the contractor will decline
to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it will raise its
price,” the Court declared.56 “Either way, the interests of the United States
will be directly affected.”57
This causal reasoning was apt precisely because the economic analyses of
Justices Brennan and Stevens that the Court rejected in Allen applied
perfectly to the corporate defendant in Boyle—and to the other large
government contractors waiting in the wings. Above all else, those
contractors were economically rational actors in their profit-seeking
negotiations with the government. With them, it was virtually certain that, if
their costs increased, they would find some way to pass those increased costs
on to the government. Thus, the Court’s causal reasoning in Boyle was apt
precisely because of the nature of the parties involved and the controlling
economic incentives that drove their behavior.
In contrast, the Court in Allen found that very same causal reasoning
wholly inapt and rejected it, and it did so because it understood that the
private schools and the white parents involved were not driven by economic
motives and would not respond to financial incentives. The motives that
drove their behavior were race-driven, not profit-driven. In Allen, then, the
Court was willing to accept a causal analysis that defied economic logic. Its
reasoning implicitly accepted the legitimacy of non-economic and obviously
racist incentives, thereby allowing racist motivations to prevent plaintiffs
from meeting the “fairly traceable” requirement. That reasoning enabled the
Court to deny the Black parents a remedy for “one of the most serious injuries
recognized in our legal system.”58
The second implicit racial aspect of the Court’s reasoning in Allen is a
buried presumption that seemed to help shape its decision. Plaintiffs
contended that the existing I.R.S. regulations and procedures allowed many
discriminatory schools to maintain their tax–exempt status. As a result, those
regulations were under-inclusive in their practical effect. Those regulations
487 U.S. 500 (1988).
Id. at 507.
Id.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984). Plaintiffs’ claim was, according to the Court,
“beyond any doubt, not only judicially cognizable” but also based on “one of the most serious injuries
recognized in [the U.S.] legal system.” Id.
55
56
57
58
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did not, that is, reach most or all discriminatory private schools. In contrast,
the Court characterized the remedial injunction that plaintiffs sought as
“requiring the IRS to deny tax exemptions to a considerably broader class of
private schools than the class of racially discriminatory private schools.”59 The
remedy plaintiffs requested, in other words, would be over-inclusive. Their
proposed regulations would not only reach more discriminatory private
schools but could also reach some private schools that did not discriminate.
Thus, the Court reasoned that both the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy and
the I.R.S. regulations were similarly flawed because both were, though in
different ways, imperfectly tailored. The plaintiffs’ proposed remedy would
be unfair, the Court implied, because it would deprive some non-racially
discriminatory parents and private schools of tax exemptions which they
could otherwise claim.60 That, it suggested, would be wrong. The Court’s
buried assumption in rejecting plaintiffs’ requested remedy meant, implicitly
but nevertheless quite clearly, that the case presented a toss-up between two
equally flawed regulatory rules and that, in such a case, it was preferable to
protect the statutory claim of white schools and parents to a tax benefit rather
than to enforce the constitutional right of Black children to a racially
integrated public school education.61
Id. at 747.
There is a “rhetoric of innocence” in many of the Supreme Court’s affirmative action cases
that “relies on the invocation of the ‘innocent white victim’ of affirmative action.” Thomas Ross,
Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 298 (1990); see also, e.g., Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298, 307-08 (1978) (plurality opinion) (reasoning that the
Constitution forbids promoting the interests of “relatively victimized groups at the expense of other
innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations.”); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 514 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“A race-conscious remedy should not be approved without consideration of an
additional crucial factor—the effect of the set-aside upon innocent third parties.”); id. at 530 n.12
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[T]he guarantee of equal protection prohibits the government from taking
detrimental action against innocent people on the basis of the sins of others of their own race.”);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that a raceconscious remedy “could lead to the very system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board of Education”);
id. at 281-82 (comparing the effects of various remedial schemes on non-minority persons). This
rationale has been widely critiqued by scholars. See generally, e.g., David Chang, Discriminatory Impact,
Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 790 (1991); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases,
100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986).
61 Revealingly, the Court acknowledged that it had reworked its standing doctrine precisely to
deal with “[c]ases such as this, in which the relief requested goes well beyond the violation of law
alleged.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19. Before Allen, the Court’s standing doctrine had only required
plaintiffs to show that the defendant’s alleged conduct had caused their claimed injury. Id.; see, e.g.,
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978) (“The more difficult step
in the standing inquiry is establishing that these injuries fairly can be traced to the challenged action
of the defendant, or put otherwise, that the exercise of the Court’s remedial powers would redress
the claimed injuries.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). The Court in Allen, however,
chose to impose two separate causality requirements, “fairly traceable” and “redressability.”
59
60
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Allen’s reasoning incorporated two racial assumptions that worked to the
legal disadvantage of Black people.62 The majority assumed that racist
motivations constituted legitimate grounds for rejecting plaintiffs’ causal
argument, and it assumed that a statutory privilege of white people should be
favored over the constitutional right of Black people. Whatever was in the
mind of the majority Justices, their assumptions and reasoning illustrated the
existence and operation of implicit and institutional racial bias.
B. Limited Discovery: The Implicit Differential Racial Impact of Harlow v.
Fitzgerald
The law of qualified immunity in civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
is severely weighted in favor of the police.63 Indeed, the Court has made it
According to Allen, “[e]ven if the relief respondents request might have a substantial effect on the
desegregation of public schools”—even if, that is, plaintiffs’ injury was effectively “redressable”—
the Court could still use its separate “fairly traceable” causal requirement to block plaintiff ’s
standing. 468 U.S. at 753 n.19. The point of the causal bifurcation was to bar relief that might be
overbroad in some way regardless of the gravity of the injury claimed, the Court’s ability to
effectively redress it, and the balance of equities between parties.
62 The majority also offered other reasons for dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, including an
argument based on separation of powers. Allen, 468 U.S. at 759-61. Its separation-of-powers analysis,
however, was premised on both its prior causal reasoning and the “toss-up” nature of the flaws it
identified in plaintiffs’ requested injunction and the I.R.S. regulation. Id. Plaintiffs’ “complaint,
which aims at nationwide relief and does not challenge particular identified unlawful IRS actions,
alleges no connection between the asserted desegregation injury and the challenged IRS conduct
direct enough to overcome the substantial separation of powers barriers to a suit seeking an
injunction to reform administrative procedures.” Id. at 766. Separation-of-powers principles are
notoriously malleable and can easily be shaped to support whatever conclusion one desires. See, e.g.,
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ANTONIN SCALIA AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE
HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A JUDICIAL ICON 55-69 (2020) (discussing the easy manipulability
of separation-of-powers reasoning to support contradictory positions); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.,
ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A
HISTORICAL INQUIRY 38-47 (2007) (“[T]he distinctions between the powers of the three branches
were inherently murky and the founders understood their natures differently.”).
63 In recognition of this reality, opposition to the doctrine of qualified immunity has grown
substantially in recent years. Since 2018, organized opposition has been led in large part by the Cato
Institute, which describes the doctrine as “an ‘unlawful shield’ against accountability” for police and
other governmental misconduct. Jay Schweikert & Clark Neily, As Supreme Court Considers Several
Qualified Immunity Cases, A New Ally Joins the Fight, CATO AT LIBERTY (Jan. 17, 2020, 5:00 PM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-court-considers-several-qualified-immunity-cases-new-allyjoins-fight [https://perma.cc/25CH-ZU3K]. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity,
120 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (2020) (analyzing how constitutional litigation would function if qualified
immunity were absent). For an extraordinary opinion criticizing the doctrine by a federal judge, see
Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 423 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (“Just as the Supreme Court
swept away the mistaken doctrine of ‘separate but equal,’ so too should it eliminate the doctrine of
qualified immunity.”). For other critiques of qualified immunity, see generally Marcus R. Nemeth,
How Was That Reasonable? The Misguided Development of Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force by
Law Enforcement Officers, 60 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1022 (2019) (arguing that the goals of qualifiedimmunity doctrine “in the policing context have largely gone unmet.”); Joanna C. Schwartz, The
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clear that its substantive policy is to protect police officers to the greatest
extent possible.64 It is one thing, however, to adopt substantive rules that
implement an openly acknowledged policy but quite another to adopt a
procedural rule that is “neutral” on its face but biased in effect. In Harlow v.
Fitzgerald65 the Court adopted such a procedural rule, one that is in practice
not only substantively biased but, far worse, racially biased. Its rule operates
with special force to protect police officers against civil rights claims by Black
people.
The Court’s substantive law protecting police officers imposes often
insurmountable barriers against civil rights plaintiffs. First, qualified
“immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law,”66 a test that means that only police officers who engage in the
most outrageous and readily proven abuses are likely to be denied immunity.
Second, qualified immunity prevails unless an officer violates “clearly
established” law that a reasonable officer should have known,67 a test that the
Court has made excessively demanding by defining “clearly established” to
require precedents on nearly identical facts from either a “controlling

Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1800 (2018) (arguing that the
Supreme Court should “overhaul or eliminate qualified immunity” on the basis that it undermines
Fourth Amendment protections); Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J.
2, 9-10 (2017) (attacking the Supreme Court’s premise that qualified immunity shields defendants
from burdensome discovery); Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of
Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of
Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1219-20
(2015) (analogizing the problems to the Supreme Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence and the
problems with the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence).
64 There was no such qualified immunity doctrine at common law when Congress enacted
section 1983. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental
Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14-21 (1972) (explaining how, in the nineteenth century in the United
States, public officials could be sued for allegedly tortious conduct); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of
Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 414-22 (1987) (describing how
the Marshall Court “developed a consistent theory of individual officer accountability” that enabled
plaintiffs to obtain damages from and injunctions against public officials); James E. Pfander &
Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in
the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1924 (2010) (“During the early republic, the courts—state
and federal—did not take responsibility for adjusting the incentives of officers or for protecting
them from the burdens of litigation and personal liability.”). The Court has, however, often claimed
the contrary. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
259, 268 (1993); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342(1986); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). On
other occasions, however, it has acknowledged that its qualified immunity doctrine is based on policy
analysis, not on the common law. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644-645 (1987); see also
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
65 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
66 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (citing White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)
(per curiam)).
67 White, 137 S. Ct. at 551.
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authority” or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority.’”68 Third,
even glaring mistakes by police officers do not deprive them of qualified
immunity,69 a rule that invites them to act rashly, or far worse.70 Fourth, in
excessive force cases—a major source of civil rights claims against police—
the Court gives officers two separate and distinct chances to escape liability
on “reasonableness” grounds, one under Fourth Amendment analysis and
another under qualified immunity principles.71 Finally, in considering
“reasonableness” courts are required to view the facts from the officer’s
perspective.72 All possible doubts, in other words, are resolved in the favor of
the police.
68 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741-42 (2011) (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617
(1999)) (making the latter requirement even stricter by adding the word “robust”). The Court has
suggested that, in the event of inconsistent circuit court decisions, “established law” probably
requires one of its own rulings that addresses a highly similar factual situation. Taylor v. Barkes, 135
S. Ct. 2042, 2044-45 (2015) (per curiam). For example, in Fourth Amendment excessive force cases,
“police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent ‘squarely governs’ the
specific facts at issue.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 (per curiam) (citing Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305,
309 (2015) (per curiam)). See also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam) (finding no
precedent squarely on point and therefore granting qualified immunity); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646
(declining to recognize an exception to the “general rule of qualified immunity” in the context of
“cases involving allegedly unlawful warrantless searches of innocent third parties’ homes in search
of fugitives.”). On occasion, the Court states the requirement somewhat differently. Although the
“Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established,
existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White,
137 S. Ct. at 551 (internal quotations omitted).
69 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641 (“We have recognized that it is inevitable that law enforcement
officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and
we have indicated that in such cases those officials . . . should not be held personally liable.” (internal
citation omitted)). Accord Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205-06 (2001) (reasoning that qualified
immunity also protects officers in the gray zone that exists between acceptable and unacceptable
uses of force); Malley, 475 U.S. at 343 (discussing the rationale for maintaining qualified, as opposed
to absolute, immunity in the context of officers requesting warrants).
70 The Court’s decision to uphold qualified immunity “is not just wrong on the law; it also
sends an alarming signal to law enforcement officers and the public. It tells officers that they can
shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go
unpunished. . . . [T]here is nothing right or just under the law about this . . . .” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at
1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Cases caused by obvious and avoidable police “mistakes” continue
to recur regularly. See, e.g., Brownback v. King, 141 S. Ct. 740 (2021) (chronicling a case in which
officers mistook an individual for a fugitive). These cases often have tragic results, as in the tragic
case of Breonna Taylor in Louisville, Kentucky, where police made mistake after mistake and then
shot to death an entirely innocent young woman who had been asleep in her own apartment. Richard
A. Oppel Jr., Derrick Bryson Taylor & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, What to Know About Breonna
Taylor’s Case and Death, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonnataylor-police.html [https://perma.cc/KB8R-QDQ2].
71 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205; accord Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-41 (emphasizing the importance of
qualified immunity in the context of officers’ probable-cause determinations).
72 The Court has emphasized “that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. . . .” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). See also Tolan v. Cotton, 854 F. Supp. 2d 444, 475 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
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The Court’s decision in Harlow added another muscular protection for
police officers. Invoking the supposedly “neutral” grounds of efficiency and
social utility, it overrode the otherwise controlling provisions of the Federal
Rules and created a severe limitation on the ability of civil rights claimants
to conduct discovery.73 The disproportionately heavy burden its rule imposes
on Black plaintiffs is clear: it blocks them from obtaining evidence of racial
bias.
Harlow discarded the subjective “good faith” element involving “intent”
or “malice” that had previously been part of the Court’s qualified immunity
test.74 In its place, it proclaimed an “objective reasonableness” standard
“measured by reference to clearly established law.”75 The earlier test was
grounded in the assumption that it would allow “insubstantial lawsuits” to be
dismissed without trial, Harlow explained, but experience had revealed the
assumption to be unwarranted: Because “disputed questions of fact ordinarily
may not be decided on motions for summary judgment . . . [a]nd an official’s
subjective good faith has been considered to be a question of fact,” the Court
explained, summary judgment was ordinarily not available as long as qualified
immunity involved an element of motive.76
It was “now…clear,” Harlow continued, “that substantial costs attend the
litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials.”77 There were
“general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial,” such as distracting
them from their duties, inhibiting “discretionary action,” and deterring able
people from public service.78 In addition, it cited other “special costs to
‘subjective’ inquiries of this kind.”79 Because “judgments surrounding
(emphasizing the importance of qualified immunity applying in the context of officers making
probable-cause determinations).
73 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (allowing broad discovery into potentially relevant
information), with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“Until [the] threshold immunity
question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.”).
74 Seven years earlier, in Wood v. Strickland, the Court denied immunity from suit to a school
board member who “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere
of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took
the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury
to the student.” 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); accord Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (opining that qualified immunity does not shield judges from qualified immunity for
“the knowing and intentional deprivation of a person’s civil rights.”).
75 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
76 Id. at 814, 816.
77 Id. at 816. The Court went on to describe the costs as including “the expenses of litigation,
the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from
acceptance of public office.” Id. at 814. It added as further costs the dangers to public officials of
being sued for actions pursuant to their duties. Id. (citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)).
78 Id. at 816.
79 Id.
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discretionary action almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker’s
experiences, values, and emotions,” it followed that summary judgment was
rarely available to address “questions of subjective intent.”80 Often there was
“no clear end to the relevant evidence,” and the result was “broad-ranging
discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official’s
professional colleagues.”81 Such broad-ranging discovery “can be peculiarly
disruptive of effective government.”82 Thus, the Court concluded, the
“subjective” element of the qualified immunity test had to be discarded in
order to limit discovery and facilitate summary judgments dismissing
plaintiffs’ claims.83
In the decades since Harlow, the Court has rigorously enforced its
“objective” standard and held that any and all evidence concerning an officer’s
“subjective intent” was “simply irrelevant.”84 The Court has also pressed the
lower courts to dismiss cases on qualified immunity grounds as early as
possible and “long before trial.”85 When federal appellate courts failed to

Id.
Id. at 817.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Harlow also sought to protect police officers, noting that “it cannot be disputed seriously that
claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty,” and it emphasized that the costs of
discovery were burdensome “not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole.” Id. at 814.
The Court’s severe institutional bias in favor of police is made even clearer by the subsequent
standard it adopted that officers deserve qualified immunity unless they are “plainly incompetent”
or “knowingly violate the law.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Harlow eliminated the “good faith” requirement of prior qualified immunity
law on the ground that it was “subjective,” but its new “knowingly violate the law” standard
incorporates its own “subjective” requirement, one essentially requiring plaintiff to show some kind
of “bad faith.” 457 U.S. at 815. Thus, in order to make it even more difficult for plaintiffs to overcome
qualified immunity, the Court has departed from Harlow’s underlying “objectivity” principle by
incorporating into the law a slightly disguised version of “bad faith” and “intent” that raises
subjective issues that plaintiffs must prove, but that would in most cases be exceptionally difficult or
impossible to prove.
84 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998). Crawford-El made clear the Court’s
determination to prevent or limit to the greatest extent possible discovery into a defendant’s
motives. Id. at 593 n.14. The Court adopted a similar rule limiting claims under the Fourth
Amendment. It rejected the proposition “that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable
behavior under the Fourth Amendment,” and “flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might
serve to strip the agents of their legal justification.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996);
accord Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (explaining that the law may protect an officer’s
actions as long as the relevant circumstances, viewed objectively, justified the officer’s actions).
Claims of racial discrimination, the court ruled, were not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment
but only under the Equal Protection Clause. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“But the constitutional basis
for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not
the Fourth Amendment.”).
85 See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (per curiam).
80
81
82
83
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enforce that policy, the Court has repeatedly and summarily reversed their
decisions.86
The racial significance of the ostensibly “neutral” and “objective” Harlow
rule is apparent. While discovery into a defendant’s “motive,” “intent,” “good
faith,” or “malice” could be burdensome on defendants, those elements are
also critical and material—and quite possibly decisive—in cases where police
officers harass, abuse, injure, or kill Black people. Though Harlow’s limitation
on discovery is formally justified as a “neutral” procedural rule based on
“efficiency” grounds, it functions in practice as a substantial institutionalized
racial bias in the law’s operations. It not only prevents inquiry into police
officers’ racial beliefs, intentions, motivations, and past behavior, but it also
enables them to hide racially-related or motivated actions behind a screen of
formalistic legal arguments about “established law.”87
To compound its effect of suppressing evidence of implicit racial bias,
Harlow’s “objective” test is not actually “objective.” Rather, both its
“established law” and “reasonableness” components involve judicial discretion
and widely varied subjective judgments about the relevant facts in the record,
the “level of generality” to be applied in identifying potentially applicable
precedents, and the proper weight of those precedents in evaluating their
“authoritative” or “persuasive” nature.88
Regardless of Harlow’s policy justifications and proclaimed “objectivity,”
two undeniable social facts determine its practical significance. One is that
police officers harass, mistreat, injure, and kill Black people far more
86 In San Francisco v. Sheehan, the Court emphasized the importance of qualified immunity “to
society as a whole,” and identified that as the reason why “the Court often corrects lower courts
when they wrongly subject individual officers to liability.” 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)). See also White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552-53 (2017)
(per curiam) (reversing the district court’s and court of appeals’ denial of qualified immunity);
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015) (per curiam) (doing the same); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 195 (2004) (per curiam) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s finding
that an officer was entitled to qualified immunity).
87 The Court has made clear that an improper or racist “motive” does not invalidate “objectively
justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment,” no matter how trivial an officer’s pretextual
“legal justification.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 812. Thus, “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Id. at 813. Indeed, the decision noted that “the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal
Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 813. The Court has trivialized the Fourth
Amendment in other ways as well. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid “a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal
offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine.”).
88 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987) (identifying the “level of generality”
problem). Compare Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (“[O]fficials can still be on notice that
their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.”), with Kisela, 138 S. Ct.
at 1153 (per curiam) (“[P]olice officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent
‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue.”).
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commonly than they do white people.89 The other is that Harlow does not
merely protect officers, but it protects them most effectively when they
commit racially influenced or motivated abuses. Beyond the fact that there
are legions of cases involving disproportionate police violence against Black
people, it is apparent that a good many of the specific instances that come to
public attention each year—especially now with the widespread availability
of phone cameras—seem so unnecessary, brutal, and extreme in the physical
force used that it is hard to believe that some form of racial antagonism or
hatred did not help kindle, spur, or direct the abuse.90 The de facto racial
context of policing in the United States makes Harlow, in practice, a biased
procedural rule.
Mounds of evidence have shown that overt and explicit racial bias exists
among police officers and sometimes even throughout entire departments.
Examples are common, widespread, and often painfully familiar.91 Police
unions in many cities have long histories of racial insensitivity and abuse, and
New York City’s Police Benevolent Association is not only the nation’s largest
but one of the worst.92 In Chicago between 1972 and 1991, police officers ran
organized torture operations against Black people, with at least 125 cases
documented and more than 500 others still under investigation.93 The Los
Angeles Police Department fostered a culture of racism and racial abuse for

89 EBERHARDT, supra note 22, at 78 (“[N]ot only were blacks significantly more likely than
whites to be stopped but blacks were significantly more likely to be searched, handcuffed, and
arrested.”).
90 The most salient example in recent years may be the murder of George Floyd
captured on video. See Amy Forliti, Four Officers Fired After Black Man Dies in Minneapolis
Police Custody and Video Shows an Officer Kneeling on his Neck, A SSOCIATED P RESS ,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/05/26/black-man-dies-minneapolis-police-c
ustody-said-he-couldnt-breathe/525802100/ [https://perma.cc/23A2-RQ2T] (last updated May
26, 2020, 8:47 PM). For another unfortunate example, see Simon Romero, Giulia McDonnell Nieto
del Rio & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Another Nightmare Video and the Police on the Defensive in
Tuscon, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/us/carlos-ingram-lopezdeath-tucson-police.html [https://perma.cc/L653-7J8H].
91 See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Lazaro Gamio, Minneapolis Police Use Force Against Black People at 7
Times the Rate of Whites, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/
03/us/minneapolis-police-use-of-force.html [https://perma.cc/3W3M-LDV8] (demonstrating that in
Minneapolis police use of physical force is far more frequent against Black people than white people,
and Black people accounted for 58 percent of police uses of force). Black people constitute 19 percent
of the population of Minneapolis, and white people 60 percent, but since 2015 Black people suffered
6,650 instances of the use of force while white people suffered only 2,750 such instances. Id.
92 William Finnegan, How Police Unions Fight Reform, T HE N EW Y ORKER (July 27,
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/08/03/how-police-unions-fight-reform
[https://perma.cc/L4DA-6EEU] (“As [New York City] erupted in protests against police
brutality, the N.Y.P.D. responded with vivid displays of more police brutality. Much of the
violence was caught on video.”).
93 Peter C. Baker, A Legacy of Torture in Chicago, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 2, 2020, at 43.
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decades,94 and an investigation after the beating of Rodney King in 1991
unearthed transcripts of conversations between officers that “likened [B]lacks
to jungle animals” (including monkeys and gorillas), while others used a code
for incidents involving Black people—“NHI,” which stood for “[n]o humans
involved.”95 In 2014 a federal investigation found an unconstitutional pattern
of racial bias in searches and arrests by the Newark, New Jersey Police
Department.96 The next year, the U.S. Department of Justice found
systematic racial bias in the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department. The
extreme disparate treatment of Black people in Ferguson, the Department of
Justice concluded, occurred “at least in part . . . because Ferguson law
enforcement practices are directly shaped and perpetuated by racial bias.”97
In 2016 text messages surfaced between San Francisco police officers that
“described [B]lacks and other minorities as wild animals, cockroaches,
savages, barbarians, and monkeys.”98 An even more recent study of 3,500
current and former police officers in eight cities across the country found that
one in five current officers and two in five former officers used racist or
otherwise biased materials in their private Facebook posts.99 Even more
recently, in June 2020, three members of the Wilmington, North Carolina
Police Department were caught on video making “racist and threatening

94 MAX FELKER-KANTOR, POLICING LOS ANGELES: RACE, RESISTANCE, AND THE RISE
OF THE LAPD 2 (2018) (“Racial targeting was central to the LAPD’s expansion of police power and
efforts to control the streets at all costs.”); KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, CITY OF INMATES:
CONQUEST, REBELLION, AND THE RISE OF HUMAN CAGING IN LOS ANGELES, 1771–1965, at 147

(2017) (noting the LAPD’s involvement in increasing the number of incarcerations of Mexicans in
Los Angeles); GERALD HORNE, FIRE THIS TIME: THE WATTS UPRISING AND THE 1960S 134-37,
150-52 (1995) (chronicling the seriousness of LAPD brutality); Fischer, supra note 26, at 871 (“The
police in Los Angeles played a crucial role in buttressing a white narrative that conflated urban
blackness with immorality and criminality, especially through the common police practice of
funneling vice to the city’s segregated black neighborhoods.”)
95 EBERHARDT, supra note 22, at 145.
96 Monique O. Madan, U.S. Inquiry Reports Bias by the Police in Newark, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/nyregion/inquiry-of-newark-police-cites-a-pattern-ofbias.html [https://perma.cc/GE68-PYHJ].
97 Matt Apuzzo & John Eligon, Ferguson Police Tainted by Bias, Justice Department Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2015, at A1. The practices are hardly new and characterize the history of many
American police departments. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Adler, Shoot to Kill: The Use of Deadly Force by the
Chicago Police, 1875-1920, 38 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 233, 245 (finding that between 1910 and 1920
twenty-one percent of the victims of police homicides were Black even though Black people
constituted only three percent of the city’s population); FELKER-KANTOR, supra note 94.
98 EBERHARDT, supra note 22, at 145. Such racist comments are not limited to police officers.
Id. at 144-50.
99 Shaila Dewan, When Police Officers Vent on Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/03/us/politics/police-officers-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/
XZ7U-6WT2] (“About one in five of the current officers, including many in supervisory roles, and
more than two in five former officers, used content that was racist, misogynist, Islamophobic or
otherwise biased, or that undermined the concept of due process . . . .”).
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comments” about Black people, one of whom said “a civil war [sic] [was]
necessary to wipe black people off the map.”100
Evidence of such vicious and explicit racism suggests that implicit and
institutional racism is likely widespread and even more common among
police officers and police departments. One study of implicit bias, for
example, showed that “self-categorization” within a social group—the group’s
effort to categorize itself in terms of its racial attitudes—can “dramatically
shift automatic social perception and evaluation.”101 Such self-categorization
processes could influence the attitudes and behavior of individual police
officers and spread through whole police departments, especially smaller and
special departmental units. “It is implausible to believe,” Eberhardt
concluded, “that officers—or anyone else—can be immersed in an
environment that repetitively exposes them to the categorical pairing of
blacks with crime and not have that affect how they think, feel, or behave.”102
Statistical studies, moreover, have repeatedly shown a broad pattern of
police discrimination against Black people. A Department of Justice study of
police encounters in 1998 found that, on a per capita basis, police were
approximately four times more likely to shoot a Black person than a white
person.103 Although Black people constituted only about 12.5% of the nation’s
population, another Justice Department study in 2011 found that between
2003 and 2009 they accounted for 31.8% of reported arrest-related deaths.104
In 2015, police officers killed at least seventy-eight unarmed Black people, an
average of nearly two a week. Thirty-six percent of all the unarmed people
that police killed were Black, almost five times the rate that police killed
unarmed white people.105 In 2019, another statistical study concluded that
100 Three North Carolina Cops Fired For Racist and Threatening Comments Caught on Lengthy Video,
CBS NEWS (June 26, 2020, 7:50 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/three-north-carolina-policeofficers-fired-racial-slurs-video/ [https://perma.cc/EE9N-4TUR].
101 Jay J. Van Bavel & William A. Cunningham, Self-Categorization With a Novel Mixed-Race
Group Moderates Automatic Social and Racial Biases, 35 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 321, 333
(2009).
102 EBERHARDT, supra note 22, at 81. “In the United States, blacks are so strongly associated
with threat and aggression that this stereotypic association can even impact our ability to accurately
read the facial expressions of black people.” Id. at 35; accord Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba
Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies, Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 876, 889 (2004) (finding the study results consistent with the
stereotypical association of Blacks and crime).
103 JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP’T JUST., NCJ 180987, POLICING AND
HOMICIDE, 1976–98: JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE BY POLICE, POLICE OFFICERS MURDERED BY
FELONS i, iii (2001).
104 ANDREA M. BURCH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 235385, ARREST-RELATED DEATHS,
2003–2009–STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ard0309st.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AP43-XN7G].
105 Samuel Sinyangwe, Mapping Police Violence, https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/
[https://perma.cc/GN3A-8SUS].
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“young men of color face exceptionally high risk of being killed by police”
and were two and a half times more likely to be killed by police than were
white men.106
Paul Butler, a law professor at Georgetown University, aptly summarized
the nature of racial policing in America: “Cops routinely hurt and humiliate
black people because that is what they are paid to do,” he declared.107
“Virtually every objective investigation of a U.S. law enforcement agency
finds that the police, as policy, treat African Americans with contempt.”108
Both the U.S. Justice Department and the federal courts have repeatedly
found “that the official practices of police departments include violating the
rights of African Americans.”109 Officers “kill, wound, pepper spray, beat up,
detain, frisk, handcuff, and use dogs against blacks in circumstances in which
they do not do the same to white people.”110
All of those studies show a common and persistent pattern, not the random
actions of “bad apples” but severe and pervasive racial bias against Black
people among large numbers of individual police officers and departments.
Those patterns can never be undone, nor their results remedied, as long as
Harlow and the current law of qualified immunity stand and police officers
are allowed and even implicitly encouraged to use force rashly, heedlessly, or
worse, and when they so often do so, especially to Black people. The
widespread and systemic operation of racial bias—implicit and institutional
as well as express and overt—shows that expanded discovery is essential and
that such discovery should be extended not only into the views, values,
motivations, and prior records of individual officers but also into the policies,
values, and practices of their entire departments and special units.111
106 Frank Edwards, Hedwig Lee & Michael Esposito, Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force
in the United States by Age, Race-Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PROC. FOR NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. 16793,
16794, 16796 (2019). An experimental study showing that training could reduce or even largely
eliminate racial bias nonetheless also found that even trained police officers continued to show some
racial bias in choosing to shoot or not to shoot and that “special-unit officers” as opposed to “beat”
officers “showed robust bias.” Joshua Correll, Sean M. Hudson, Steffanie Guillermo & Debbie S.
Ma, The Police Officer’s Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 8 SOC.
& PERSONALITY PSYCH. COMPASS 201, 209 (2014).
107 PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 2 (2017).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 3.
110 Id.
111 New York has recently repealed its statute that prevented the disclosure of many such
police records. See Testimony of Alvin Bragg, Co-Director of the New York Law School Racial
Justice Project, Regarding the Repeal of New York Civil Rights Law Section 50-a, Before the New
York Senate Committee on Codes, N.Y.L. S CH . R ACIAL J UST . P ROJECT 1 (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies_on_policing_s3695_repeals_provisions_101719.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NAV6-ZP3Y] (highlighting the reasons to repeal the statute); Leonard Greene, ‘We Are at
a Moment of Reckoning’: Repeal of 50a Shield Law Gives Measure of Accountability to Families Touched by Police
Brutality, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 13, 2020), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-50a-repeal-police-
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While there could be any number of possible illicit motives—jealousy,
avarice, scapegoating, sexual predation, or simple personal animosity—behind
police harassment or abuse, there are two critical differences between claims
involving possible racial bias against Black people and claims involving those
other kinds of motives. First, any acts giving rise to claims involving those other
kinds of motives would usually constitute independent criminal acts—such as
extortion, robbery, or sexual harassment—that could be proven in court without
the need to establish motive. Second, and more important, none of those other
kinds of motives has caused the same kind of everyday, extensive, and sharplydefined patterns of abuses that racial bias has generated. Unlike those other
kinds of motives, racial bias has been shown by an overwhelming wealth of
evidence as the cause of systemic practices of police harassment and abuse
against Black people, especially Black males.
Thus, in cases where defendants raise a qualified immunity defense, the
law could serve “efficiency” goals by barring or severely limiting inquiries into
most kinds of “motives” while making an exception for cases involving
potential or suspected racial bias. At a minimum, such discovery should be
allowed—indeed, mandated—in any case where a Black person (or a member
of any other minority group known in particular localities to suffer
discrimination at the hands of police officers) suffers physical injury or death
at the hands of the police and the police do not have a factually
unquestionable justification for their behavior in the situation and for their
use of force. Further, discovery in such cases should extend not just to the
individual officers involved but also to their whole department and special
units. Given the social context in which such cases arise, Harlow’s ostensibly
“neutral” procedural rule is anything but “neutral.” It establishes a severe
institutional bias disproportionally disadvantaging Black civil rights
claimants.
C. Summary Judgment: Implicit and Institutional Racial Bias Under Rule 56
There is an extensive literature evaluating summary judgment, much of it
sharply critical on both practical and normative grounds,112 but the procedure
transparency-20200614-p7qodt3gffbcdcmz5okiyrrhba-story.html [https://perma.cc/F2MG-VTX2] (similar).
As a result, the New York Civil Liberties Union has been able to establish a searchable database (“NYPD
Misconduct Complaint Database”) that contains 320,000 misconduct complaints dating back to 1985. NYPD
Misconduct Complaint Database, N.Y. C.L. UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/campaigns/nypd-misconductdatabase [https://perma.cc/7PDL-5Q2E].
112 Diane P. Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 36 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 231, 232 (2011) (noting that today’s summary judgment looks nothing like the “Utopian
picture” it was intended as); Burbank, Vanishing Trials, supra note 8, at 620 (finding that summary
judgement vastly grew in importance in the 1970s); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 140 (2007) (arguing that summary judgement is an
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has nonetheless been used increasingly since the 1970s113 and vigorously
supported by the Supreme Court since 1986.114 While its use raises many
issues, one of the most obvious is its susceptibility to the influence of implicit
and institutional racial bias. Even in relatively simple cases, the broad
discretion judges enjoy in handling summary judgment motions allows them
to “massage” the facts in deciding how to rule. “Massaging facts occurs when
judges who possess the same information use it in different manners,”
Professor Suja A. Thomas wrote.115 Such massaging “can occur in a number
of ways,” such as when courts ignore relevant facts or fail to consider how
relevant facts can be viewed differently or give rise to conflicting
inferences.116
unconstitutional litigation route because it “fails to preserve a civil litigant’s right to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment.”); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984-85 (2003) (acknowledging the potential dangers that
modern summary judgement might pose for Seventh Amendment rights); Samuel Issacharoff &
George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 74 (1990)
(examining the “costs” against the intended benefits of summary judgement); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L.
REV. 705, 709 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is granted disproportionately in employment
discrimination matters). For defenses of summary judgment, see, for example, Edward Brunet, The
Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 689, 690 (2012). See also Ilana Haramati,
Procedural History: The Development of Summary Judgment as Rule 56, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 173,
207 (2010) (hailing summary judgment as “an invaluable tool for expeditious modern litigation and
docket management.”).
113 For a discussion of the expansion of summary judgment, see Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury:
Constitutional Conflicts in Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483 (2010),
and Richard L. Steagall, The Recent Explosion in Summary Judgments Entered by the Federal Courts Has
Eliminated the Jury from the Judicial Power, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 469 (2009).
114 In 1986 the Court handed down a “trilogy” of cases that praised the summary judgment
procedure and encouraged the lower courts to use it more readily. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Stephen Burbank has questioned the impact of these cases
and argued that the expansion in summary judgments began in the 1970s for other reasons. Burbank,
Vanishing Trials, supra note 8, at 620. This claim that has since received considerable support but that
has not yet been clearly established. Compare Linda S. Mullenix, The 25th Anniversary of the Summary
Judgment Trilogy: Much Ado About Very Little, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561, 584 (2012) (“The various FJC
studies of post-trilogy summary judgment practice have demonstrated that the disposition rates . . .
have not increased in statistically significant ways in the aftermath of the trilogy.”), with Gelbach,
supra note 33, at 1689 (explaining that “given the absence of careful consideration of changes in party
behavior, the data we have simply cannot tell us” the impact of the trilogy).
115 Suja A. Thomas, Reforming the Summary Judgment Problem: The Consensus Requirement, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2252 (2018).
116 Id.; see also David L. Lee & Jennifer C. Weiss, Inferences in Employment Law Compared to
Other Areas of the Law: Turning the Rules Upside Down, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 781, 785 (2012)
(“[D]ecades of experiences . . . and exposure to decisions from other areas of the law have led
plaintiffs’ employment lawyers to believe that the inferences judges would not permit juries to draw
in employment cases would be commonplace inferences that judges permit in other areas of the
law.”).
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To the extent that the standards for granting summary judgment allow
courts to “massage” the record, implicit biases can become a controlling
masseur. This danger could be especially threatening in highly contentious
and fact intensive Fourth Amendment cases involving claims of excessive
force where the standards are particularly “malleable.”117
A well-known Supreme Court decision and the famous empirical study it
spurred demonstrate the extent to which summary judgment rulings can be
highly subjective and even arbitrary. In Scott v. Harris,118 a Black man who
was severely injured by a white police officer after a car chase and crash
brought suit for damages against the officer.119 The defense introduced a
police videotape of the chase and crash, and on appeal an eight-justice
majority on the Supreme Court held that the videotape was dispositive.120 It
ruled that the tape showed conclusively that the plaintiff’s reckless driving
created a public danger that justified the police officer in stopping him by
forcing his car off the road, and it granted the officer summary judgment
dismissing the complaint.121 In doing so, the Court contradicted the views of
the trial judge, three judges on the Eleventh Circuit, and Justice Stevens,
whose solo dissent offered a detailed critique of the majority’s interpretation
of the tape. Thus, the Court held that there was no “genuine dispute of
material fact” even though five of thirteen federal judges—38% of those who
saw the tape—thought there was one.
In the wake of the case, three scholars conducted a study of the way 1,350
Americans perceived the tape, confirming the subjective nature of the
judgments involved and explaining why thirteen federal judges could split 8

117 See Craig M. Reiser, The Unconstitutional Application of Summary Judgment in Factually
Intensive Inquiries, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 195, 222 (2009) (“[C]ourts have, at least occasionally,
granted summary judgment in seemingly weak [Fourth Amendment excessive force] cases where
strict adherence to the standard would likely result in a different outcome.”).
118 550 U.S. 372 (2007). Eight justices joined the majority, two of whom (Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer) also wrote separate concurrences.
119 Id. at 374-75.
120 Id. at 378-79.
121 Id. at 379-81. The Court stated that it was “happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself ”
and attached it to the official record as Exhibit A at page 36 and made it available on the internet at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/media/video/mp4files/scott_v_harris.mp4 [https://perma.cc/
5JJ5-RF2P]. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 n.5. The true “real world” test of the Scott v. Harris rule may well
come in the future, as more and more videos recorded by civilian bystanders provide visual evidence
of what actually transpired in incidents involving alleged police harassment and abuse. In those
cases, under what conditions and to what extent will courts find that those videotapes are also
dispositive? See Audra D.S. Burch & John Eligon, Bystander Videos of George Floyd and Others Are
Policing the Police, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/george-floyd-minneapolispolice.html [https://perma.cc/D5TQ-SB2B] (last updated Mar. 5, 2021) (noting that bystander
videos often contradict initial official reports of incidents).
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to 5 in deciding what the tape showed.122 They found that most of the study’s
participants concurred in varying degrees with the majority’s conclusion that
plaintiff ’s behavior “posed a deadly risk to the public,” but they also found
that 45% of their subjects thought that the police chase itself “was not worth
the risk it posed to the public.”123 More important, they found that those who
agreed and disagreed with the majority’s conclusion about the videotape were
marked by “various individual characteristics,” including their different ages,
income and educational levels, marital status, political affiliation, ideological
beliefs, cultural values, and (to a slight extent) gender.124 Hardly surprising,
they found that “being African American (as opposed to white) exert[ed] the
largest effect across the various response measures.”125
Two conclusions surely follow. One is that the existence of a “genuine”
dispute about “material” facts in the case depended on neither the contents
of the videotape nor the formal requirements of Rule 56 but on which of the
thirteen federal judges decided the case. The other is that social factors and
implicit biases, not the contents of the videotape and not Rule 56, were
apparently decisive.
Bearing in mind those findings about implicit racial bias and the sociallyshaped perceptions that color individual judgments, a detailed examination
of another case is illustrative. A civil rights action involving a Black plaintiff
shot by a white police officer, Tolan v. Cotton involves troubling questions
about the treatment of the officer’s motion for summary judgment at both the
district and circuit court levels.126 The lower court decisions in Tolan illustrate
the potentially dispositive nature of the sweeping discretion that judges enjoy
on summary judgement, and they suggest the subtle but nonetheless likely
influence of implicit and institutional bias in the law. Fortunately, the

122 Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009) (“Our subjects
didn’t see things eye to eye. A fairly substantial majority did interpret the facts the way the Court
did. But members of various subcommunities did not.”).
123 Id. at 864-65.
124 Id. at 867-69.
125 Id. at 867.
126 854 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D. Tex. 2012), aff ’d 713 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2013). For discussions of
the case, see Ed Brunet & John Parry, Guest Post: Brunet and Parry on Tolan v. Cotton, CIV. PROC.
& FED. CTS. BLOG (May 8, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/05/guest-postbrunet-and-parry-on-tolan-v-cotton.html [https://perma.cc/28DC-YFVR] (noting that the Tolan
decision could be seen as merely “correcting a grievous error” or as a way to “embolden courts to
identify disputed facts”); Howard M. Wasserman, Mixed Signals on Summary Judgment, 2014 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1331, 1345 (2014) (arguing that Tolan should be seen as a “simple case involving
established precedent”).
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Supreme Court ultimately intervened and reversed the lower courts’ grant of
summary judgment to the officer.127
Many of the basic facts in Tolan are undisputed. In Bellaire, Texas, a
middle-class suburb outside of Houston, Officer John C. Edwards of the local
police department followed two young Black men, Robbie Tolan (“Robbie”)
and his cousin Anthony Cooper, as they drove home from Jack in the Box, a
chain fast food restaurant, at two o’clock in the morning on New Year’s Eve,
December 31, 2008.128 After a short drive, Robbie and Cooper turned into a
cul de sac, parked in front of one of the houses on the street, exited their car,
and walked toward the house.129 Edwards drove past their car toward the end
of the cul de sac, mistakenly typed in the wrong license plate number on his
Mobile Data Terminal (“MDT”), and received a report that the car was
stolen.130 Edwards then called for back-up, turned around and drove back
toward the Tolans’ car, pulled up “at a distance” from it, aimed his patrol car’s
spotlight at the two young men, got out with drawn gun and shining flashlight
in hand, and ordered them to come to him.131 Both immediately protested,
asking Edwards what he was doing and why, and Edwards told them that they
were driving a stolen car.132 By that point, Robbie was on the front porch of
the house at the door, and Cooper was behind him in the front yard.133

127 Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (per curiam). The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit
on the ground that it had misapplied the summary judgment standard. Id. at 660. (“By weighing
the evidence and reaching factual inferences contrary to [plaintiff ’s] competent evidence, the court
below neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage,
reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.”). Though the Court’s
intervention might be heartening, it should not be expected in very many cases. Concurring, Justice
Alito noted the unusual nature of the Court’s decision to review a case on such factual grounds. Id.
at 661 (“[G]ranting review in this case sets a precedent that, if followed in other cases, will very
substantially alter the Court’s practice.”).
After remand to the district court, the judge who had originally granted Cotton summary judgment
announced that she “thought [she] was right the first time” and refused to recuse herself from hearing the
case. The Tolans then settled out of court for $110,000. Settlement Reached in Police Shooting of Former
MLB Player’s Son, LEGAL READER (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.legalreader.com/settlementreached-in-police-shooting-of-former-mlb-players-son/ [https://perma.cc/TLY4-87JG] [hereinafter
Settlement Reached].
128 Tolan, 572 U.S. at 651; see also ROBBIE TOLAN & LAWRENCE ROSS, NO JUSTICE: ONE
WHITE POLICE OFFICER, ONE BLACK FAMILY, AND HOW ONE BULLET RIPPED US APART 17
(2018) (detailing Tolan and Cooper’s whereabouts prior to arriving at the Tolan household).
129 Tolan, 713 F.3d at 301.
130 The Tolans’ car was also the same make and approximate year of the car that had been
reported stolen. Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 302.
133 Robbie was originally not seen by Sergeant Cotton because of his placement on the front
porch of the home. Id. (“Although Sergeant Cotton did not immediately observe Robbie Tolan,
whose form was obscured by a planter on the front porch, Officer Edwards informed Sergeant
Cotton that ‘the two on the ground had gotten out of a stolen vehicle.’”). See also Tolan v. Cotton,
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Edwards kept his flashlight and gun pointed at both of them and ordered
them to lie down.134
Almost immediately, Robbie’s parents, Bobby Tolan (“Bobby”) and
Marian Tolan (“Marian”), dressed in their pajamas, came rushing out of the
house.135 Bobby told the two young men to stop protesting, remain silent, and
lie down as Edwards had instructed.136 Both Robbie and Cooper immediately
did so.137 Marian walked around the yard protesting Edwards’ actions while
Bobby came up to talk to Edwards.138 Both identified Robbie as their son and
Cooper as Robbie’s cousin, and they explained that they were the owners of
both the house and the car the two young men had been driving.139 The car,
they assured the officer, was not stolen.140
A minute and a half after Edwards started the confrontation Sergeant
Jeffrey Wayne Cotton arrived on the scene.141 He spoke with Edwards,
decided to take control of the situation, and ordered Marian to stop moving
around and stand by the garage.142 When she failed to comply and continued
to protest, he grabbed her, began pushing her up the driveway, and at some
disputed point shoved her against the garage door.143 From the front porch
fifteen to twenty feet away, Robbie yelled at Cotton to “‘[g]et your fucking
hands off [her]’” and—because he had been lying on the porch with his feet
toward the driveway and his head toward the front door—began to turn
around and raise up to see what Cotton was doing to his mother.144 At that
point Cotton claimed to be in fear for his safety because Robbie was moving,
and his hand was at his waist which was covered by a “hoodie.”145 Thinking
that the “hoodie” might hide a gun, Cotton immediately shot at Robbie three
times.146 He hit him once in the chest, nearly killing him and ending his
promising young baseball career.147

854 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“Robbie Tolan lay down on the porch of the house….
[and] Cooper knelt down on the ground, nearer to Officer Edwards.”).
134 Id.
135 Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 652 (2014).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Tolan, 713 F.3d at 302.
139 Tolan, 572 U.S. at 652.
140 Id.
141 Tolan, 713 F.3d at 302.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 303.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.; Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 654 (2014).
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There was no dispute that the Tolans owned both the house and the car
that Robbie and Cooper were driving,148 and there was no dispute that Robbie
had no gun and was wholly unarmed.149
Subsequently, Cotton was found not guilty on criminal charges, and after
that the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
granted him summary judgment dismissing the Tolans’ civil suit.150 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.151 Tolan stands
out because it illustrates the kinds of implicit and institutional biases that may
infect not just police officers but also the courts. First, the opinions of both
lower courts exemplify the way judges have shifted the formal law to allow
them, in effect and contrary to the mandate of the law,152 to weigh the
evidence153 and to discount statements in plaintiffs’ sworn affidavits as
irrelevant “conclusory allegations.”154 Similarly, the lower court opinions show
how qualified immunity claims have reversed the normal rule that requires
Tolan, 572 U.S. at 652.
Tolan, 713 F.3d at 303.
The civil suit initially involved numerous state and federal claims brought by Bobby,
Marian, Robbie, and Cooper against Edwards, Cotton, the city of Bellaire, and others. Tolan v.
Cotton, 854 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 (S.D. Tex. 2012). All of the claims were eventually dismissed on
stipulation of dismissal without prejudice except for claims by the four plaintiffs against Edwards,
Cotton, and the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 448 n.2. Subsequently, Edwards and Cotton
moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and the circuit court’s opinion
addressed that motion. Tolan, 713 F.3d at 304. The central focus in the action and on the motion was
Robbie’s claim against Cotton for violating his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and the discussion that follows focuses on the courts’ treatment of that claim.
151 Only Robbie and Marian pursued the appeal on their section 1983 claims, and they only did so on
their claim against Cotton. Tolan, 713 F.3d 299, 301, 304 (5th Cir. 2013). A recent study by Reuters of 529 cases
decided since 2005 found that the Fifth Circuit was the most favorable circuit court in the U.S. for upholding
grants of qualified immunity to police officers, doing so in 64 percent of the excessive force cases it heard.
Andrew Chung, Lawrence Hurley, Andrea Januta, Jackie Botts & Jaimi Dowdell, Shot by Cops, Thwarted by
Judges and Geography, REUTERS (Aug. 25, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/usa-police-immunity-variations [https://perma.cc/AN6K-XZUS].
In a separate analysis of 435 district court decisions from 2014 to 2018, the study also found that
judges in Texas granted qualified immunity to police in 59 percent of the excessive force cases, while
judges in California do so in only 34 percent of such cases. Id.
152 E.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (“[I]t is clear enough from
our recent cases that at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter . . . .”). Accord id. at 255 (“Credibility determinations,
the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a
directed verdict.”).
153 The district court stated that it would “grant summary judgment in any case where critical
evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of
the nonmovant.” Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d 444, 426 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting
Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (2005) (internal quotations omitted)).
154 Even with sworn testimony in the record supporting plaintiff ’s contentions, the court can
apparently dismiss some or all of it if it characterizes the content as mere “conclusory allegations”
or “unsubstantiated assertions.” Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 462 (internal quotations omitted).
148
149
150
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the moving party to carry the initial burden of proof. Under the lower court
opinions in Tolan, an officer who moves for summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds “does not have the burden to establish it.”155 Instead, it is
the plaintiff who carries the burden of negating the assertion of qualified
immunity.156 Those rules combine to essentially reverse the fundamental
principle of summary judgment that “the facts and inferences to be drawn
from them must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.”157
Second, the two opinions reveal the predetermining pro-police nature of
the tight zoom-in focus the two courts used to dismiss the relevance of every
fact that was unfavorable to the police. The first element of the technique,
the district court explained, is the principle that Cotton’s actions were
“required to ‘be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene.’”158 That requirement, the Court of Appeals acknowledged up front,
“steers the analysis” in Cotton’s favor.159 The second element is the rubric of
“material facts” that the two courts used to ignore virtually everything that
happened before the actual shooting.160 The only “factual information”
relevant to the issue of the shooting, the district court insisted, involved “the
observations Sergeant Cotton made, which led him to fire.”161 That “factual

Id. at 463.
Id. (“Plaintiffs must satisfy their burden by negating immunity by specifically identifying
evidence that rebuts the Defendants’ presumed entitlement to dismissal based upon qualified
immunity.”). See also id. (“The plaintiff, bearing the burden of negating the defense, cannot rest on
conclusory allegations and assertions, but must demonstrate genuine issues of material fact
regarding the reasonableness of the official’s conduct.”). The Fifth Circuit agreed. See Tolan, 713 F.3d
at 304.
157 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 462. The Supreme Court explained that the Fifth Circuit “improperly
‘weigh[ed] the evidence’ and resolved disputed issues in favor of the moving party.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
158 Tolan, 713 F.3d at 306.
159 Id. at 306 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
160 For example, one critical fact in understanding the situation had to do with Robbie’s claim
that he turned and started to rise up because Cotton threw his mother against the garage door and
when she hit the door there was a loud crashing sound. The district court treated it thusly:
155
156

Robbie Tolan, Marian Tolan, Anthony Cooper, and Officer Edwards all testified that
Robbie Tolan yelled to Sergeant Cotton after Marian Tolan hit the garage door.
Sergeant Cotton testified that Robbie Tolan yelled to him before he pushed Marian
Tolan away, and she hit the garage door. Sergeant Cotton testified, “I do not disagree
that the noise [of Mrs. Tolan hitting the garage door] happened . . . . I disagree as to
when the noise happened.” . . . This disputed fact is not material to the determination
of the issue of qualified immunity. It is not disputed that Robbie Tolan shouted at
Sergeant Cotton and quickly got up from his prone position and turned his body
around.
Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted).
161 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
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information” included essentially only three facts: Cotton heard Robbie shout
at him and saw him turning around; Cotton saw Robbie’s hand at his waist
covered by the “hoodie” and speculated Robbie might be reaching for a
hidden gun,162 and Cotton feared for his life.163 With that severely truncated
focus on “a very few seconds,”164 the court easily concluded that “there are no
disputes of material fact” about the shooting.165 Thus, it was able to find
Cotton’s shooting “reasonable” and grant him summary judgment.166
Agreeing that there was no dispute as to any “material facts,” the court of
appeals affirmed.167
The extreme bias in that tight zoom-in focus is apparent. If a court
constricts its consideration only to the exact moment when an officer can
claim—offering only the slightest possible self-serving justification—that he
feared for his safety, there can be no possible alternative but to find a shooting
“reasonable.”168 Narrowing the relevant context to nothing but the exact
162 The district court underscored the determining power of the zoom-in technique, the
officer’s perspective, and the selection of “material” facts. Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 475 (“The fact
that Robbie Tolan did not reach for his waistband area [as if to draw a weapon] is not material to
the determination of whether Sergeant Cotton should be entitled to the defense of qualified
immunity. Rather, it is the reasonable officer’s perception of the situation that decides qualified
immunity.”).
163 The appellate court even dismissed the relevance of the location of Robbie’s hands and
arms when he turned around. It described the situation as follows:

Fearing Robbie Tolan was reaching towards his waistband for a weapon, Sergeant
Cotton drew his pistol and fired three rounds at Robbie Tolan, striking him once in
the chest and causing serious internal injury. At the time, Robbie Tolan was wearing
a dark zippered jacket, known as a “hoodie”, which was untucked and hung over the
top of his trousers, concealing his waistband. A subsequent search revealed Robbie
Tolan was unarmed.
Tolan, 713 F.3d at 303. It concluded, however, despite Robbie’s statement that he was not reaching
toward his waistband, that “whether Robbie Tolan reached into or toward his waistband [did] not
create a genuine dispute of material fact.” Id. at 307 (emphasis in original).
164 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
165 Id. at 451.
166 Tolan, 713 F.3d at 308.
167 Id. at 301 (“Because no genuine dispute of material fact exists for whether Sergeant Cotton’s
directing deadly force at Robbie Tolan and non-deadly force at Marian Tolan was objectively
unreasonable in the light of clearly-established law, the Rule 54(b) judgment in favor of Sergeant
Cotton is AFFIRMED.”). While the district court placed its dismissal on the ground that Robby’s
constitutional rights had not been violated, the court of appeals based its judgment on qualified
immunity grounds. Id.
168 The Court avoided making a decision on this issue in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137
S. Ct. 1539 (2017), which dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s “provocation rule” but failed to decide what
occurs when it is unreasonable conduct on the part of the officer that creates the need for deadly
force. Another case recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, City of Tahlequah, Oklahoma v.
Bond, also presented the issue. No. 20-1668, 2021 WL 4822664 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2021) (per curiam). In
a per curiam opinion, the Court continued to give qualified immunity an exceptionally sweeping
scope in allowing police use of deadly violence. Reversing the Tenth Circuit, it construed the record
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moment when an officer perceives a threat and responds, the officer’s action
could always be judged “reasonable” no matter what preceded it. That rigidly
constricted focus excludes everything else that happened, including the prior
mistakes, misjudgments, provocations, and abuses of the officers involved.
The zoom-in focus essentially predetermines the issue and constitutes a
profound institutional bias against all victims of police violence.
Third, and most telling, the lower courts repeatedly drew inferences in
favor of the police officers while improperly dismissing the contradictory
testimony that the Tolans presented.169 To begin, the district court accepted
the officers’ contention that they faced “a dangerous and uncertain scene,”170
while the appellate court characterized the situation as “chaotic and
confusing.”171 The courts adopted those characterizations in spite of the fact
that the two “suspects” were lying silently on the ground, complying with
Edwards’ order and covered by Edwards’ gun, while Bobby and Marian—an
elderly man and woman in their pajamas—were attempting to identify
themselves and the “suspects” and to explain that there had been a mistake
and that the car was not stolen.172 Similarly, both courts accepted Cotton’s
judgment that he needed to “control” the situation173 while ignoring plaintiffs’
testimony showing that the situation did not need control but rather the most
basic exercise of simple decency and common sense. Consequently, both
courts ignored the truly decisive fact that everything that followed was the
direct result of Edwards’ mistakes and misjudgments and Cotton’s heedless
and aggressive intrusion that transformed an easily corrected police error into
a tragic and unnecessary shooting.
The district court also dismissed other specific facts in the record that
supported the Tolans. It ignored the contrary testimony of Robbie, Bobby,
and Marian when it concluded that Marian “was an individual out of control”
and asserted—again, flatly contrary to the record—that there was “no
dispute” about that.174 Similarly, it dismissed Marian’s testimony when it

favorably toward the police and granted them judgment. Id. at *3. At the same time it explicitly
held open the question "whether recklessly creating a situation that requires deadly force can itself
violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at *2.
169 As the following material shows, the biased reasoning of the lower courts was far more
extensive and insupportable than the relatively narrow grounds the Supreme Court cited in
reversing their grant of summary judgment. For the Court’s quite limited examination of the way
the lower courts treated the record, see Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 654-55 (2014).
170 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
171 Tolan, 713 F.3d at 302.
172 See supra notes 135–140 and accompanying text; see also Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 451-52.
173 See supra note 142 and accompanying text; see also Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
174 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
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accepted Cotton’s version of his treatment of her.175 Indeed, despite Marian’s
contrary testimony about the way Cotton grabbed and pushed her, the court
whitewashed Cotton’s behavior by averring that he merely “guided” her to the
garage and then, topping that, went so far overboard in Cotton’s favor that it
adopted his gentlemanly characterization that he was actually “escorting” her,
as if to the prom.176
Again, despite contrary testimony from both Robbie and Marian, the
court accepted the officers’ version of Robbie’s position at the time of the
shooting and declared that he was up in a “vertical position.”177 Compounding
that error, it also suggested that Robbie may well have been preparing to
attack Cotton when he turned around and rose up. “He was not yet fully
standing up, nor was he moving towards Sergeant Cotton,” the court wrote,
“but he was in the process of standing up.”178 There was no way the court
could possibly have known that Robbie intended to stand up, nor that he was
“in the process” of doing so. The record contained evidence that he was
merely turning around to better see what Cotton was doing to his mother. By
improperly inferring from contested testimony that Robbie intended to stand
up, the court suggested that Robbie could well have been preparing to attack
Cotton, an unwarranted suggestion that lent support to Cotton’s claim that
he reasonably feared for his safety.
Further, the district court accepted the officers’ claim that they had to
control the situation “so that they [could] safely confirm the identities of
unknown persons.”179 That claim was implausible at best. As for safety, the
officers faced no observable threat either from the two “suspects” lying
quietly on the ground, covered by Edwards’ drawn gun,180 or from the elderly
couple in their pajamas. As for the officers’ claim that they merely wanted to
175 Id. at 468-70 (citing Sergeant Cotton’s testimony as evidence for the court’s undisputed
findings of fact). Compare Cotton’s version to how Robbie later described the situation:

[Cotton] grabbed my mother, a fifty-five-year-old woman, and threw her like a rag
doll against the garage door. You should understand that my mother is not a big woman
at all. She’s a tiny petite woman, who even in the most warped fantasies couldn’t
threaten or harm anyone. So when Cotton grabbed her and flung her to the garage
door, it was like he’d lifted her body off the ground.
TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 24.
176 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 459, 475.
177 Id. at 470. Edwards stated that Robbie appeared to be charging. Id. at 472. Cotton stated
that Robbie “was getting up and turning around,” and later that “[h]e was on both feet.” Id. at 472,
473. Contradicting their testimony, Robbie testified that he was shot before he could get up. Id. at
471. And Marian testified that Robbie was “on his knees” when he was shot. Id. at 472.
178 Id. at 473.
179 Id. at 469.
180 Tolan v. Cotton, 713 F.3d 299, 307 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Officer Edwards continually covered
Robbie Tolan and Cooper with pistol drawn throughout the sequence of events.”); see also Tolan, 854
F. Supp. 2d at 459 (“Officer Edwards was still ‘covering’ Robbie Tolan and Anthony Cooper.”).
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“confirm the identities” of everyone, that was exactly what neither of them
made the slightest attempt to do. At no point did either Edwards or Cotton
take the painfully obvious step of actually listening to Bobby’s and Marian’s
repeated explanations, asking them to produce some form of identification,
or—most immediately obvious of all—simply requesting them to produce the
car’s registration papers.
Further massaging the record in Cotton’s favor, the district court
implicitly accepted Cotton’s version of both the time when he pushed Marian
against the garage door and the reason he did so. Robbie testified that he
yelled at Cotton only because Cotton had pushed his mother against the
garage door with enough force to make “a loud banging sound” when she hit
it.181 Cotton did not deny either the push or the loud banging sound that
followed but testified that he only pushed Marian against the door after
Robbie yelled at him, not before.182 Ignoring the significance of the disputed
timing of Cotton’s shove, the court blandly announced that whether Cotton
pushed Marian before or after Robbie yelled was not “material.”183 Then, the
court once again went even further in whitewashing Cotton by implicitly
rejecting Robbie’s testimony and accepting Cotton’s contention that he
181 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 469; accord id. at 454, 456, 472 (highlighting testimony that there
was a banging sound when Marian hit the garage door). The court summarized Robbie’s testimony
as follows:

Robbie Tolan had continued to turn his head to the left and look backwards to follow
what was going on between Sergeant Cotton and Marian Tolan. He had a good view
of them. He saw and heard Sergeant Cotton push my mom against the garage door
. . . . And it made a loud noise. The sight and sound of his mother being pushed
against a metal garage door caused [him] to want to get up from the position that [he
was] laying in . . . . because [he was] upset about seeing [his] mother being pushed
into a garage door.
Id. at 452 (alterations in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
182 Id. at 469. The district court summarized Cotton’s testimony as follows:
“As soon as [he] addressed her, [Sergeant Cotton] holstered [his] weapon and then
was trying to gain her compliance.” When Marian Tolan would not comply, Sergeant
Cotton testified that “I grabbed her right arm, I believe with my right hand, and put
my left hand at the small of her back to start escorting her over to the garage door.”
Marian Tolan was talking as he was escorting her, and soon after he first touched her,
“she flipped her arm up trying to flip my—hand off of her and said, ‘Get your hands
off of me.’” She tried to flip up her right arm, and she turned over her right shoulder
to say to him, “Get your hands off me.” All the while he was walking her in the
direction of and getting closer to the garage door.
Sergeant Cotton testified that he was gripping her arm, “not as hard as I could, but
enough to—to gain control of another person.” His “intention was certainly not to
cause a bruise . . . .” He did not believe that he had caused bruises.
Id. at 458-59 (insertions in original) (citations omitted).
183 Id. at 469-70.
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needed to push Marian into the garage door so he would be free to face the
threat he feared after Robbie yelled at him and began to turn around. “Viewed
objectively,” the court offered, “the force Sergeant Cotton used to push
Marian Tolan [against the door] was not excessive to the need, nor
unreasonable under the circumstances.”184 The court could have found
Cotton’s shove “not excessive” and “not unreasonable in the circumstances”
only if it found that he had pushed her after Robbie yelled at him, not before.
Indeed, it could only have made that finding if it accepted Cotton’s testimony
and rejected Robbie’s testimony to the contrary.
Adopting yet another conclusion inconsistent with the record, the district
court also accepted Cotton’s testimony that his behavior toward Marian was
an effort to “calm her.”185 The record established two fatal flaws with that
claim. First, both Bobby and Marian testified that she remained “calm” and
was merely trying to explain—quite clearly and quite truthfully—that she and
her husband owned the house and car, and that the car was not stolen.186 Thus,
when the court accepted Cotton’s “calming” claim, it again violated the law
of summary judgement because it accepted Cotton’s testimony while rejecting
the contrary testimony of both Bobby and Marian.
The second fatal flaw is that Cotton’s own testimony contradicted his
“calming” claim. That testimony showed that he could not possibly have made
the slightest effort to “calm” Marian but, instead, mistreated her almost
immediately by quickly grabbing her, then pushing her, and finally shoving
her into the garage door. The critical fact in recognizing the wholly
unbelievable nature of Cotton’s “calming” claim is the undisputed fact that
only a bare 32 seconds elapsed between the moment Cotton arrived on the
scene and the moment he shot Robbie.187 In those fleeting 32 seconds Cotton
claimed under oath that he did all of the following:188
1. exited his car,
2. drew his gun,
3. moved onto the lawn close enough to Edwards that he touched “him
on the shoulder with his shoulder,”189
Id. at 470.
Id. at 467.
Compare id. at 467 (“Marian Tolan was walking around the yard, getting in the way of
Officer Edwards’s pointed weapon, upset, angry, and loudly protesting. . . . [her] activities warranted
Sergeant Cotton’s efforts to calm her and put her into a neutral position.”), with Tolan v. Cotton,
538 F. App’x 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2013) (Daniels, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(“[Marian] and her husband testified that she was calm and merely explained to both officers that
she and her husband owned the Nissan and house and that Robbie lived there with them . . . .”).
187 Tolan v. Cotton, 713 F.3d 299, 303(5th Cir. 2013); Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 456.
188 The following actions are from the district court’s summary of Cotton’s and Edwards’
testimonies. Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 457-61.
189 Id. at 457-58.
184
185
186
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asked Edwards what was going on,
listened to Edwards tell him “that two of the four people in the front
yard came out of the house and two came out of the car,”190
continued to listen as Edwards told him further that “‘the two on the
ground had gotten out of a stolen vehicle’,”191
observed Cooper on the ground,
observed Robbie on the porch,
recognized that both “suspects” were complying with Edwards
orders,
decided that he needed to “search and handcuff the suspects,”192
holstered his gun,
decided he “‘needed to get [Marian] controlled,’”193
heard Marian say “‘That’s our car,’”194
asked Marian—not once, he testified, but “‘several times’”—to move
toward the garage door,195
heard Marian say, “‘We live here, what are you doing here, you
shouldn’t be here, and that that’s our car,’”196
responded to Marian’s statements and actions by telling her to calm
down,
recognized where he and Marian were and realized that they were
not close to the garage,
grabbed Marian’s right arm and moved her toward the garage,
witnessed Marian push his hands away and say: “‘Get your hands off
of me,’”197
re-grabbed Marian and continued to move her toward the garage
door,
turned and got a clearer view of Robbie lying on the porch,
recognized that Edwards was still covering Robbie and Cooper with
his gun,
continued to move Marian nearer to the garage door,
heard Robbie shout “Get your fucking hands off her,”198
observed Robbie turning around and getting “‘halfway up or so,’”199
observed Robbie’s right hand at his waistband,

Id. at 460.
Id. at 458.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 459.
Id.
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27. thought that Robbie “was drawing a weapon from his waistband,”200
28. concluded that his safety was in danger,
29. pushed Marian away from him and into the garage door with a loud
bang,201
30. “took probably at least a step away from her and turned to face”
Robbie,202
31. drew his holstered weapon, and
32. fired three shots at Robbie.203
All those things Cotton claimed to have done in 32 seconds. More, all of
those things he claimed to have done while also moving some thirty or forty
feet from his patrol car to Edwards’ shoulder, then on to Marian, and—with
her objecting to his actions—grabbing and then re-grabbing her, and pushing
her all the way up the driveway to the garage. Cotton’s claimed “calming”
justification for his treatment of Marian was simply incredible, and the court’s
acceptance of it had no reasonable foundation in the record.
As for the court of appeals, it added its own equally troubling moves.204
It stated that at the moment of the shooting Robbie was “abruptly attempting
to approach” Cotton,205 a statement that was unfounded and inconsistent with
most of the record.206 There was, in fact, no way that it could possibly have
known that Robbie was “attempting to approach” Cotton. Its characterization
of Robbie’s action doubly violated the rules of summary judgment: it drew an
inference in favor of the moving party, and it ignored evidence in the record
that supported the non-moving party’s contrary claim. The only reason it
could have appeared in the court’s opinion—an assertion unwarranted by the
Id. at 460.
Items numbered 30 and 31 appear id. at 474.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 475.
The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc denied a rehearing in the case. Judges Dennis and Graves
dissented, challenging the panel’s questionable analysis. See generally Tolan v. Cotton, 538 F. App’x
374 (5th Cir. 2013) (Dennis, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
205 Tolan, 713 F.3d at 308.
206 The district court claimed, somewhat ambiguously, only that Robbie had reached a “vertical
position” but not that he was moving toward Cotton. Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 470. Further, it stated
that Robbie was “not running toward” Cotton but only “turning around to face” him. Id. at 460.
Robbie testified that he was shot before he could get up. Id. at 471. Further, Marian testified that
Robbie was “on his knees” when he was shot. Id. at 472. On the other hand, Cotton testified that
Robbie was “on both feet,” id. at 460, and Edwards testified that Robbie “looked like he was going
to go forward.” Id. at 461. Neither Edwards nor Cotton claimed that Robbie was actually moving
toward Cotton. When he was shot, Robbie was nowhere near Cotton—he was fifteen to twenty feet
away from him. Tolan, 713 F.3d at 303. Indeed, Robbie’s blood stains near the front door of the house
showed that he had not moved toward Cotton and that, when he was shot, he was still near the door
where he had dropped down as instructed. Tolan, 538 F. App’x. at 377 (Dennis, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
200
201
202
203
204
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law and unsupported by the record—was that it seemed to strengthen
Cotton’s claim of “fear.”
Showing even more favoritism toward the officer, the appellate court not
only ignored the testimony of both Robbie and Marian that Cotton gave no
warning to Robbie before shooting him, but it also tried to justify Cotton’s
behavior by imagining a wholly unwarranted—indeed contrary to fact—
inference in his favor. The court literally made up what can only be termed a
storybook “warning by judicial fiat.”207 According to the appellate court:
Robbie Tolan had clear and obvious warning of Officer Edwards’ and
Sergeant Cotton’s believing deadly force might be required under the
circumstances: both made clear their belief Robbie Tolan’s vehicle was stolen;
Sergeant Cotton drew his pistol upon his arriving on the scene; and Officer
Edwards continually covered Robbie Tolan and Cooper with pistol drawn
throughout the sequence of events.208

None of those background facts constituted an actual warning. The
appellate court simply and arbitrarily asserted that Robbie should have
inferred a warning from selected parts of the context, and it deployed that
assertion to proclaim the existence of a justificatory “warning” by the police
that did not in fact exist.
Further, the appellate court exhibited the subjectivity involved in its
power to root through the record to pick out whatever “facts” it wished to
count as relevant and “material.” To support summary judgment for Cotton, it
highlighted several peripheral facts that seemed useful in buttressing Cotton’s
claim that he reasonably felt his safety was threatened. “Compounding that
threat,” it itemized, were certain facts in “the surrounding circumstances: the
late hour; recent criminal activity in the area; a dimly-lit front porch; Marian
Tolan’s refusing order to remain quiet; and the officers’ being outnumbered
on the scene.”209 From all of the evidence in the record, in other words, the
appellate court selected as relevant and “material” only those that seemed to
lend credibility to Cotton’s claim of fear. All else it ignored.210
207 See Tolan, 713 F.3d at 307 (presenting the facts in clear favor of the officer and against the
victim while ignoring the rules of summary judgment). Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari, app
E at app.102, app.106, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (No. 13-551) (recounting Robbie’s
testimony that Cotton gave no verbal instructions or warnings before he fired at him and Marian’s
testimony that Cotton did not give a verbal instruction or warning before firing at Robbie), with id.
at app.104 (recounting Cotton’s testimony that he did verbalize a warning at Robbie by saying, “stop
or no”).
208 Tolan, 713 F.3d at 307.
209 Id.
210 The appellate court went out of its way to compliment the district court for “an extremely
detailed and well-reasoned opinion,” id. at 303, even though it changed the grounds of decision and
based its affirmance on a different point of law. See id. at 306 (passing over the district court’s holding
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Indeed, the appellate court, like the district court, also highlighted the
importance of the darkness of the night, but the two courts did so only to
support the position of the police officers. The former noted the “dimly-lit”
nature of the front porch, and the latter noted “the poorly lit front yard and
driveway.”211 Further, both courts found it useful to cite Cotton’s statement
that he regarded his situation as dangerous because the area of the porch and
yard was “dark.”212 In relying on those “facts,” the courts ignored Bobby’s
testimony that the area was reasonably well lit by a gas lamp on the porch and
two floodlights shining on the driveway. The scene, Bobby testified, was “not
in darkness.”213
The courts’ treatment of the darkness issue exemplified another propolice bias in the law, for both courts passed over it when they casually noted
that Edwards had made a mistake in identifying the Tolans’ car as stolen.214
If darkness was a relevant fact helping Cotton, then it was also a relevant fact
magnifying Edwards’ fault in causing all that followed. The darkness of night
would have meant that Edwards should have known that he could easily have
made a mistake either in initially observing the license number of the Tolans’
car or in entering the number in his MDT. As a consequence, he should have
known that he needed to recheck the number and confirm his information.
Of course, the law gave the courts a perfect technical reason for ignoring the
importance of the darkness as it weighed against the officer: his mistake
simply did not count and, consequently, evidence regarding it could not be
“material.”
Finally, both lower courts refused even to mention the fact that Marian
testified that Cotton had grabbed her and then shoved her against the garage
door so forcefully that it caused bruising on her arms and back, and neither
mentioned the additional fact that she offered photographic evidence to show
the bruising.215 Worse, the district court again showed its favoritism toward
Cotton by quoting his claim that his intention “was certainly not to cause a
bruise” and that he “did not believe that he had caused bruises” while refusing
even to note Marian’s contradictory testimony or supporting photographic
evidence that Cotton had, in fact, bruised her.216 Cotton’s statement of

that Robbie and Marian had not shown a constitutional violation and adopting instead the rationale
that Cotton’s behavior was not “objectively unreasonable”).
211 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 450; Tolan, 713 F.3d at 307.
212 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 458, 460, 474; Tolan, 713 F.3d at 302.
213 This violation of the principles of summary judgment was one of the grounds on which the
Supreme Court reversed. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 658 (2014).
214 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 450; Tolan, 713 F. 3d at 301.
215 Tolan, 572 U.S. at 653.
216 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 459. The lower courts presumably dismissed Marian’s evidence of
bruising because it was not “material” to the shooting itself, but that does not explain either why the
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“belief ” hardly qualified as credible evidence on the issue, while Marian’s
specific testimony and supporting photographic evidence surely did. The
district court, however, was willing to specifically cite Cotton’s self-serving
declaration of his “belief ” that he had done no harm while ignoring the
contradictory testimonial and physical evidence that he had treated her so
roughly that he had in fact bruised her.217
The lower courts’ ruthless use of the tight zoom-in technique, their
dismissal of the testimony of the Tolans, and their wholesale disregard for
most of the things that happened that night were especially ironic in light of
the test they applied in exonerating Cotton for the shooting. To the shooting
itself, they applied a “totality of the circumstances” test.218 “The issue,” the
district court wrote, was whether “any reasonable officer could have evaluated
the totality of the circumstances confronting Sergeant Cotton that early
morning and reached the decision that under the law deadly force was
permissible.”219 It then concluded:
Sergeant Cotton misinterpreted Robbie Tolan’s intended actions, but his
firing on Robbie Tolan did not violate Robbie Tolan’s constitutional rights
because Sergeant Cotton feared for his life and could reasonably have
believed the shooting was necessary under the totality of the factual
circumstances evidenced by the summary judgment record.220

The court of appeals reiterated and reaffirmed that standard.221 Not
surprisingly, Cotton’s testimony had carefully set up the courts’ exonerating
conclusion perfectly. It was, Cotton testified and the district court readily
quoted, the “totality of everything that was happening that put me in fear.”222

two courts failed even to mention such a critical issue or why the district court recognized Cotton’s
denial without acknowledging Marian’s claim and supporting evidence.
217 The evidence of Marian’s bruising appeared in the judicial opinions only because the
Supreme Court twice noted it. See Tolan, 572 U.S. at 653, 659 (referring to testimony that supports
the assertion that Marian was bruised).
218 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 475-76; see also id. at 466 (citing United States v. Michelletti, 13
F.3d 838, 840 (5th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 759 n.5 (5th Cir.
1999)) (describing the requirements for justifying an investigative stop under a totality of the
circumstances test).
219 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 475-76.
220 Id. at 477.
221 “To be sure, it was clearly established that shooting an unarmed, non-threatening suspect
is a Fourth-Amendment violation. But, that is only half of the equation for second-prong analysis;
the remainder depends upon the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable, on-thescene officer without the benefit of retrospection.” Tolan v. Cotton, 713 F.3d 299, 307 (5th Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
222 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 460.
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Unfortunately, neither of the lower courts gave heed to the true “totality
of the circumstances” on that fateful night.223 Rather, they based their
holdings on their predetermining zoom-in technique and what was actually a
“totality of a few carefully selected pro-police circumstances” that limited
“material” facts to those Cotton perceived at the moment of the shooting.
That focus allowed Cotton to claim—essentially on his own testimony—that
he feared for his life and was thus allowed to shoot a Black man in the chest
without legal sanction.224 To fully realize the implicit and institutional bias in
the courts’ use of the predetermining zoom-in technique, it is necessary to
itemize the true “totality of [all of] the circumstances” that existed that night.225
1. At some point after Robbie and Cooper left a restaurant where they
had picked up food to take home, Edwards began following them.226 The
officer had no reason to suspect any wrongdoing, nor was there anything
suspicious about a car on the road at 2:00 a.m. on New Year’s Eve.227
2. Edwards decided to follow the car into the cul de sac because he
claimed that it made an “abrupt” or “hurried” turn” onto the side street.228
Such a turn is hardly uncommon, and it constituted no danger or lawbreaking in the absence of other nearby cars or pedestrians. Further, even if
Edwards might have suspected possible drunk driving, he witnessed the car
being parked and the occupants getting out and leaving it.229 Thus, he had no
reason to suspect future unsafe driving that night.

Id. at 475-76.
Cotton claimed that Robbie’s hands were at his waistband, that he thought Robbie might have a
weapon, and that he feared for his life. Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 459, 460, 470, 477. Cotton’s attorney stressed
the sufficiency of Cotton’s testimony to warrant summary judgment in his favor. “The Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that claims against police need to be considered from the officer’s perspective at the time of
the shooting, not with all the information available in hindsight,” he explained. What matters “is what Cotton
says he felt at the time of the shooting.” Michael Barajas, Robbie Tolan’s Police Brutality Case Might be PrecedentSetting—But So What?, HOUS. PRESS (Sept. 16, 2015, 12:06 PM), https://www.houstonpress.com/
news/robbie-tolan-s-police-brutality-case-might-be-precedent-setting-but-so-what-7769001 [https://perma
.cc/WB4T-HXXT].
225 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 475-76.
226 Edwards contended that he just happened to notice the Tolan’s car ahead of him on a street.
Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 449. Robbie later stated that at some point he “noticed that a Bellaire
police car had started following us.” He explained that “Bellaire cops were known for cruising up
and down the quiet streets of Bellaire, looking for people who didn’t belong” and “the Bellaire police
department had a long history of interpreting that to mean black and brown people.” TOLAN &
ROSS, supra note 128, at 17.
227 Robbie later explained the police car had followed his car from the time he and Cooper left
a Jack in the Box with food to take home. TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 19.
228 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 449, 466 (recounting Edward’s description of the turn as an
“abrupt turn” and a “hurried turn”).
229 Robbie stated that he and his cousin “hadn’t had anything to drink, and we weren’t on any
drugs.” TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 17.
223
224
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3. Edwards claimed to be suspicious of the car’s occupants because
there had been vehicle burglaries and thefts reported in the area.230 Edwards,
however, witnessed the car’s occupants exit their vehicle and head not toward
some other car but toward the house “as if to enter a residence.”231 Because
the two men did not approach any other vehicle as if to burglarize or steal it,
Edwards had no reason to suspect that they were readying for such crimes.
4. Then, Edwards decided to pursue another suspicion and find out if
the car the two young men were driving had itself been stolen. But, in doing
so, he misidentified the car by typing in the wrong license plate number,232
the fatal error that caused everything that followed.
5. Edwards failed to recheck the license plate number and confirm that
the vehicle was stolen. Due to the fact that he was driving past the Tolans’ car
in darkness while trying simultaneously to maintain control of his moving
vehicle, observe the number on the other car’s license plate, and keep track of
the movements and different locations of two separate “suspects,” he should
have known that it was quite possible if not likely that he could have made a
mistake.233 After the shooting, other police officers who came on the scene
did recheck the license plate and readily ascertained that the Tolans’ car was
not stolen.234
6. Edwards failed to recognize that there was no reason for haste. If the
two young men had actually stolen the car they were driving, they would
hardly have parked it in front of the house they were planning to enter and
where they could easily be found later that night or the next morning.235

230 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 449, 466 (recounting Edwards's statement that there had been
burglaries and thefts in the area); Tolan v. Cotton, 713 F.3d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 2013) (recounting
Edward’s statement that there had been burglaries in the area).
231 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
232 “Unfortunately, when [Edwards] entered the license plate number into the MDT [Mobile
Data Terminal] he made a mistake. The actual number of the SUV was 696BGK, but Officer
Edwards typed in 695BGK.” Id.
233

Getting the license plate wrong was not uncommon, we later found out when we asked
a relative who is a cop. Sometimes the cop punching in the license plate is trying to
drive and work his dashboard at the same time, and mistakes happen. Because it’s so
common to get a false hit, most police departments follow a procedure to have their
officers double-check the license plate when the car is parked. However, despite
parking his police car directly in front of our car, with our license plate clearly in view,
as his dash camera would show during future court proceedings, Officer Edward did
not re-check the plate.
TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 22-23.
234 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
235 TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 19-20. “As I was about to put the key in the door, I heard
Officer Edwards.” Id. at 19.
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7. Edwards hastily and unnecessarily decided to intervene. There was
no need for immediate action because there was no indication that the two
“suspects” were returning to the car and preparing to drive away. Edwards
knew exactly where the car was parked and exactly where the two “suspects”
were located.
8. After Edwards exited his patrol car, he failed to reasonably question
the two “suspects.” He did not ask for their identification, listen to and
consider their explanations, or recognize the significance of the fact that
neither of them attempted to flee into the night or to make any threatening
move toward him. Instead, he kept his flashlight and gun pointed at them and
demanded that they stop where they were and get on the ground.236
9. Edwards refused to respond respectfully to the nearly immediate
appearance of Bobby and Marian or to listen to the explanations they were
offering.237 They were two elderly individuals; they came directly out of the
front door of the house the “suspects” were trying to enter; they were dressed
in their pajamas; they explained that they were the owners of the house and
car; and they identified one of the “suspects” as their son and the other as
their nephew. Bobby, moreover, immediately showed his good sense by trying
to calm everyone and by effectively de-escalating the situation. He instructed
the two “suspects” to shut up and lie down, a direction that the two young
men obeyed at once. Then the parents carefully and truthfully informed
Edwards that they owned both the house and the car the “suspects” had been
driving. Ignoring their explanations, Edward ordered Bobby to get against
the truck in the driveway and kicked his feet apart to make him spread
eagle.238
10. Edwards then misconstrued the protests of Marian. He failed to
understand why a mother would be legitimately upset in the circumstances.
More important and revealing, he immediately perceived a slight, petite fiftyfive-year-old woman in her pajamas as creating a serious threat.239

Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
When Bobby came out of the house and Edwards turned his flashlight on him, he
“instinctively raised his hands to show that he wasn’t a threat.” TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 21.
238 Robbie later wrote that Edwards had treated Bobby himself as a suspect:
236
237

“Spread your arms and get up against the truck!” Officer Edwards yelled at my dad.
My father immediately complied. While I was lying flat on the ground, I watched as
Officer Edwards pushed my dad against our Chevy Suburban, with his gun right at
my father’s head. He kicked at my dad’s feet in order to make him spread eagle.
TOLAN
AN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 23.
239
39 ”My mother is not a big woman at all,” Robbie later wrote. “She’s a tiny petite woman, who
even in the most warped fantasies couldn’t threaten or harm anyone.” TOLAN & ROSS, supra note
128, at 24.
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11. Edwards failed to simply ask the parents to get the registration
papers for the car and show him evidence that they owned it. That simple
request could have obviated everything that followed.
12. When Cotton arrived approximately one and a half minutes after
Edwards,240 he abruptly intervened and made the egregious misjudgment that
he needed to aggressively “take control.”241 With the “suspects” on the
ground, Edwards covering them with drawn gun, and an elderly man and
woman trying to explain things, the situation was already and quite clearly
under control.
13. Cotton refused to take the most obvious and immediately effective
actions necessary to resolve the situation clearly, quickly, and peaceably. He
did not recheck the license plate, ask the parents for identification, or request
Bobby or Marian to produce the car’s registration papers. Although the
district court sought to defend Cotton’s actions by claiming that he needed to
protect the “integrity” of his investigation,242 Cotton never began an
investigation that needed to be protected.
14. Cotton refused to try to de-escalate the situation. The context was
one that cried out for police restraint and respect—a house and neighborhood
where an elderly man and woman standing in a front yard in their pajamas at
two in the morning and claiming to own the house and the car in question
would seem entirely credible and would properly require a respectful and deescalating response. Cotton disregarded all those facts and virtually
immediately began handling the woman.
15. Cotton also misjudged Marian and her behavior. He failed to take
account of the fact that a woman claiming to be the mother of one of the
“suspects” and the owner of the house and car would have every reason to be
upset. Instead of trying to de-escalate matters and deal calmly and reasonably
with her protestations, he, like Edwards, could only see this slight, elderly
woman in pajamas as a dangerous threat.243
16. Cotton mistreated Marian personally and physically. He initiated the
use of unnecessary physical force by almost immediately grabbing Marian
and pushing her toward the garage door and then shoving her against the
garage door so forcefully that her body made “a loud banging sound” when
she hit.244
Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 458. See TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 21-22 (describing the
aggressive nature with which the police officer intervened).
242 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
243 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 458, 460, 467.
244 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 469. Cotton did not deny that when Marian hit the garage door
it made a loud noise. “I do not disagree that the noise [of Mrs. Tolan hitting the garage door]
happened.” Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
240
241
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17. Cotton made a mistake in perceiving the movement of Robbie’s arms
as Robbie attempted to turn around, raise up, and see what Cotton was doing
to his mother. Cotton claimed that he thought that Robbie’s movements were
part of an effort to get up and attack him,245 but in the circumstances such an
attack would have been exceptionally unlikely.246 Edwards was covering
Robbie with his drawn gun;247 Robbie was fifteen to twenty feet away from
Cotton; and there was no reason to automatically assume that he had a
weapon. Most compelling, Cotton should have known that even if Robbie
had a gun, he would surely not draw it and shoot for another compelling
reason: Cotton was standing next to Robbie’s mother, and Robbie would
surely not risk shooting and hitting her.
18. Cotton made the final and irreparable mistake of shooting Robby.248
He defended his action by claiming that he was in fear of his life.249 The only
evidence of that fear was his own personal testimony, and the justification he
claimed for his fear was the direct result of his own heedless, reckless, and
abusive behavior.
The true “totality of [all of] the circumstances”250 showed an extended
series of police mistakes, failures, misjudgments, provocations, and abuses.
Refusing to try to resolve the situation easily and respectfully, Cotton
drastically escalated it, transforming an easily corrected misunderstanding into
a police-provoked shooting. For the law to hold that an officer can make a
245 As Robbie later described the situation, seeing Cotton throw his mother against the garage
door caused him to “snap[]”:

There was something about seeing my mother being abused that instinctively made
me want to protect her–protect her in the same way that she wanted to protect me.
“Get your fucking hands off my mother!” I shouted as I slowly rose from the ground,
my hands and arms still spread wide. I never did stand up, because as I rose to one
knee, Sgt. Cotton turned, aimed his .45 down at me, and fired at my chest.
TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 24-25.
246 Such an attack would likely have seemed plausible to Cotton only if he understood that he
had grabbed Marian’s arm too roughly, manhandled her in pushing her down the driveway, and
thrown her into the garage door with unnecessary force.
247 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 459; Tolan, 713 F.3d. 299, 307 (5th Cir. 2013).
248 Robbie later recalled the moment of the shooting:
I slumped against the front door and slowly slid down to the ground. “Oh my God, I
can see smoke coming from his chest!” my mother screamed, as she saw the damage
the bullet had done to my body. “That’s just smoke from the fibers of his clothes,” Sgt.
Cotton said, as casually as one would say that he likes ketchup with his fries. He
appeared to be unbothered as I sat there dying, although he would say something very
different during the trials.
TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 25.
249 ”Sergeant Cotton testified that he fired the shot in self defense because he feared for his
life, believing Robbie Tolan was pulling a weapon from his waistband area.” 854 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
250 Id. at 475-76.
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“mistake” and still get qualified immunity251 does not and should not control
a case where officers pile mistake upon mistake, misjudgment upon
misjudgment, disrespect upon disrespect, and abuse upon abuse to foment an
unnecessary confrontation that allows one of them to shoot another person on
the officer’s own self-serving claim that, at the very last second, his own
needless actions led him to fear for his safety.252 Both the district and circuit
courts rightly referred to the shooting as “tragic,”253 but both refused to
identify the actual cause of the tragedy. They simply exonerated its instigators.
The question of implicit and institutional racial bias haunts the case. As
for the police, the officers understandably and predictably denied any racial
motivation. Edwards testified that he did not know that the “suspects” were
Black when he initially followed them and that he did not know that Robbie
was Black until after he had been shot and taken to the hospital.254 Cotton
testified that he did not know the race of either the two “suspects” or of
Robbie’s parents when he first arrived on the scene.255
Their testimony is obviously off the point. The record shows that both
officers knew that they were dealing with African-Americans throughout
their confrontation. Edwards testified that he knew Cooper was Black when
Cooper was on the ground; he saw Marian as she walked around the yard;
and Bobby “came up to talk” to him.256 Cotton testified that he saw Bobby
and Cooper and that he was in close physical contact with Marian.257 Thus,
whatever role race played in the actions of Edwards and Cotton, it was certain
that both knew full well at every relevant moment that Cooper and the Tolans
were Black.
Discussing plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim, the district court noted that
“Plaintiffs have alleged their personal beliefs that race was a factor in the
adverse actions taken against them,” but it declared that “such a personal belief,
251 See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 195 (2001) (“mistaken” belief about facts does not
deprive officers of qualified immunity), overruled on procedural grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223 (2009); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 635 (1987) (police action based on mistake
does not bar qualified immunity).
252 The Court has explained that “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application” and “its proper application requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396 (1989). The lower courts did not give “careful attention” to all of the facts of the Tolans’
“particular case” and, until Cotton’s heedless and aggressive actions forced the final confrontation,
there was no serious threat to the officers and neither suspect was “actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396.
253 “Tolan was tragically shot.” Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 449; “It goes without saying that this
occurrence was tragic.” Tolan, 713 F.3d at 308.
254 Id. at 461, 465.
255 Id. at 457, 465.
256 Id. at 460, 461.
257 Id. at 457.
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unsubstantiated, cannot support their claim.”258 Accepting the statements of
Edwards and Cotton at face value, it concluded that there was “simply no
admissible evidence Plaintiffs can point to that contradicts this testimony.”259
Even in the absence of direct evidence of racial bias on the officers’ part,
three facts strongly suggest its presence and influence. The first is that
Edwards—for reasons he failed to explain—claimed that he somehow just
happened to find himself following the Tolans’ car and that, after witnessing
it make an “abrupt” turn, followed it into the cul de sac. There, he saw two
young Black men exit the car in a predominantly white, well-to-do residential
suburb.260 The Tolan’s house was located on a lovely side street with only
about a dozen homes on it. Wide grassy areas separated the street from the
sidewalk, and large well-tended lawns with many trees along the way
separated the sidewalks from the houses.261 The Tolans’ house itself had an
estimated value of approximately half a million dollars.262 In such a location,
little or nothing would ordinarily seem the least bit suspicious—with one
glaring exception: the presence of two young Black men in an
overwhelmingly white suburb at two in the morning.263 Whether or not race
was involved in Edwards initial decision to follow Robbie and Cooper, once
they exited their car Edwards knew that he was dealing with two African
American males in a predominantly white, middle-class neighborhood at a
late night hour.264 For his part, Cotton knew exactly the same thing the
moment he got out of his car and saw Cooper and the Tolans.

258
259
260

Id. at 465.
Id.
Bellaire is one of those predominantly white bedroom communities you can find
anywhere in America. Adjacent to the city of Houston, with its pesky black and Latino
inner-city populations, the Bellaire suburb is a testament to the experience of white
flight, with high property values, safe streets, and middle-class stability, whereas the
black and brown communities in Houston are equated with ghettos, crime, and slums.

TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 10.
261 Id. at 10-12.
262 In 2020 the Tolan’s house was valued at between approximately $470,000 and $490,000, with
one estimate reaching as high as $550,000 and another coming in at $835,084. The house may be
viewed on Google Maps, and a Google search for the value of the house resulted in the estimates
quoted in the text. The first two searches were conducted on June 1, 2020, and the highest value was
found on a search conducted on April 11, 2020.
263 In 2010 only 2.8% of Bellaire’s population of 16,907 was Black. U.S. C ENSUS
B UREAU , Quick Facts, Bellaire City (Apr. 1, 2010), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts
/fact/table/bellairecitytexas/PST040219 [https://perma.cc/EZ3F-P5QT].
264 Robbie later explained that “Bellaire cops were known for cruising up and down the quiet
streets of Bellaire, looking for people who didn’t belong” and “the Bellaire police department had a
long history of interpreting that to mean black and brown people.” TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128,
at 17.
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Second, the Tolan’s expensive home located in such a well-to-do middleclass neighborhood presented exactly the kind of setting where any reasonable
person would expect that an elderly man and woman coming out of their front
door at two in the morning in their pajamas and claiming to own the house
would immediately be considered credible and treated with respect. Edwards
and Cotton, however, gave Bobby and Marian neither credence nor respect.
They peremptorily refused to consider their explanations and assurances, and
they failed even to show them the least bit of consideration by asking for their
personal identification papers or the car’s registration certificate. Instead,
Edwards treated Bobby like a suspect, pointing his gun at Bobby’s head and
forcing him to spread eagle against the truck in the driveway by kicking his
feet apart;265 and Cotton—within seconds of arriving—felt free to repeatedly
grab Marian and begin shoving her down the driveway to the garage. The
adamant refusal of the officers to treat Bobby and Marian with the slightest
degree of respect combined with Cotton’s rush to handle Marian physically
suggests that the officers regarded the Tolans with wholly unwarranted
disdain and distrust—if not instinctive dislike. Their actions intimate nothing
so much as the kind of racial bias that social psychologists have repeatedly
found in white people and that so often mark the hostile and aggressive
attitudes that many police officers show toward Black people.266
Third, Cotton excused his shooting by exploiting the racially loaded fact
that Robbie was wearing a “hoodie”—a commonly understood term
associated with young Black men—to explain why Robbie seemed so
dangerous.267 The “hoodie” justified his fear, Cotton explained, because it
covered Robbie’s waistband and could have concealed a weapon.268 Cotton’s
explanation was a classic example of the use of racially-evocative language to
associate Black people with danger and violence. The fact that Robbie was
wearing a “hoodie” became for Cotton the justification for his fear and the

Id. at 23.
See, e.g., EBERHARDT, supra note 22 at 103-06 (discussing a study on police officers’
disparate treatment of Black drivers versus white drivers). Even after the shooting the police
continued to treat the Tolans badly. TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 26-27, 35. The Bellaire police
and mayor immediately told the press that the case involved no racial profiling. Id. at 47.
267 In 2012, for example, when Trayvon Martin, a young Black man, was shot and killed by a private
citizen in Florida, he was also wearing a “hoodie.” Katie Rogers, JaʼRon Smithʼs Balancing Act: A Black
Republican Navigates the Trump White House, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/07/12/us/politics/jaron-smith-trump-white-house.html [https://perma.cc/DKE7-45TD].
268 Tolan v. Cotton, 854 F. Supp. 2d 444, 459-60, 474 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Tolan v. Cotton, 713 F.
3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 2013). As one Black male law professor explained: “I like hoodies but I won’t
wear one, and it’s not mainly because of the police. It’s because when I put on a hoodie everybody
turns into a neighborhood watch person.” BUTLER, supra note 107, at 10.
265
266
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excuse for his instantaneous decision to shoot, a justification that the lower
courts readily accepted.269
Given those three considerations together with the true “totality of [all of]
the circumstances,” it seems highly likely that implicit racial bias, if not worse,
was at work. Viewed in any plausible light, undisputed testimony established
that Edwards initiated a series of provocative and aggravating blunders, while
Cotton’s own testimony showed that his actions were reckless, thoughtless,
unnecessarily aggressive, antagonistic, and abusive. In context, those qualities
suggest strongly that racial stereotypes and preconceptions, explicit or
implicit, animated their behavior.
As for the lower courts themselves, it is revealing in the first instance that
neither the district court nor the appellate court was willing to pick up in the
slightest on the disturbingly obvious racial aspects of the case. To the facts
suggesting the likely relevance of race, they tightly shut their eyes. Indeed,
the district court attempted to excise the race issue entirely with a revealingly
one-sided put-down sentence. Summarizing Bobby’s testimony, it sought to
repudiate any racial claims with absolutely preclusive effect by stating that
Bobby “agreed that he had ‘no facts’ that lead him to believe that the race of
anybody involved had anything to do with shooting.”270 Then, at the end of
the sentence, it tacked on a brief, dismissive throwaway clause: “but he has
his opinion.”271 The “no facts” part of the sentence was comprehensive, and it
banished the race issue from the case entirely; the tag-on clause registered
nothing but an implication that Bobby himself might be the one who held
some groundless racial bias, in his case a bias against white police officers.
Apparently, unless Edwards and Cotton had shouted vicious racial slurs so
that all could hear—especially if a tape recorder or video camera had recorded
their words—there could never have been a cognizable race issue in the case.
For his part, Robbie’s opinion was quite clear. As he later wrote:
[I]f you were a person of color, then normal didn’t matter. You could still be
considered a suspect in the eyes of the Bellaire police. You didn’t belong, no
matter how much you thought you did. It didn’t matter if you stayed out of
trouble, paid your taxes, or scored touchdowns for Bellaire High School. If
you were black or brown in Bellaire, Texas, you’d better have your papers

269 Cotton testified as follows: “It appeared that [Robbie] was drawing a weapon from his
waistband . . . . Oh, I don’t know that I could see his hand specifically. I could see where his hand
was, but, you know, his clothing was probably covering the hand.” Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
270 Tolan, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 457.
271 Id. at 457.
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ready to show to the Bellaire police, or things could turn ugly. I learned how
ugly on December 31, 2008.272

Even if the refusal of the two lower courts to address the racial context of
the case was justified by the absence of specifically race-related “material”
facts, their formal reasoning nonetheless suggested the presence of implicit
and institutional bias.273 Whether that bias was simply to favor the police in
every conceivable way, or whether it was something more specifically racial,
is unknown. In any event, their consistently pro-police reasoning, designing
selection of “material” facts, dismissal of the non-moving party’s testimony,
one-sided interpretation of the record, evocative choice of descriptive
language, and the appellate court’s manufacture of a non-existent “warning,”
all seemed consistently slanted, distinctly un-neutral, and at some points
arbitrary if not worse. Their reasoning clearly violated the legal principles
that are supposed to control motions for summary judgment, and all of those
violations favored the police. Whatever it was that informed the two courts’
understanding of the record and animated their reasoning, institutional and
implicit bias of one kind or another was surely at work.
IV. TWO CONCLUSIONS
A. The Law in the Supreme Court
In spite of its commitment to fairness, neutrality, and justice, American
procedural law in its application is hardly immune from the influences of the
nation’s long racial history and ingrained cultural biases. Allen, Harlow, and
Tolan all reveal that disturbing truth in varying ways. In Allen the racial bias
in the Court’s reasoning was likely entirely unconscious, and in Harlow the
racial consequences of its ruling may have been far from the Court’s mind. In
Tolan, conversely, there may have been a glimmer of recognition. In their
different ways, however, all reflected the persistence of racial bias in the
American legal system and its presence in the application of its “neutral” and
“colorblind” procedural rules.
However unconscious the racial assumptions and unintended the racial
consequences of the first two cases, it is worth noting that both exhibited the
same distinctive characteristic that revealed their shared social and cultural
272 TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 16. “After my shooting incident occurred, a reporter
from the Houston Chronicle decided to interview some of the 150 black residents of Bellaire and ask
them about their experience with the Bellaire police. There was a litany of racial profiling
complaints.” Id. at 15.
273 After the Supreme Court’s reversal, the trial judge, like the two officers, made an off-thepoint declaration, stating that she “has never expressed a personal bias or prejudice against Robert
R. Tolan or in favor of Jeffrey Cotton.” Settlement Reached, supra note 127.
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genesis. Each showed a special concern for ostensibly “innocent” people—in
civil rights cases almost invariably white—who might somehow be harmed or
disadvantaged by the claims of Black plaintiffs. Allen criticized the relief that
the Black parents sought by noting that it could harm innocent, nondiscriminating white people,274 while Harlow defended its new immunity test
on the ground that “it cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run
against the innocent as well as the guilty.”275 Both cases illustrated the fact
that beginning in the 1970s, members of the Court began revealing a
preference for protecting white people whom they conceived of as “innocent”
over Black people who were asserting constitutional injuries.276 To the same
point, the post-Nixon Court frequently emphasized the importance of
barring “frivolous” and “insubstantial” claims, but it consistently passed over
the equal importance of eliminating “frivolous” and “insubstantial” defenses.
Virtually never, for example, did it mention the acute threats to justice caused
by such social and institutional forces as the “blue wall of silence” with its
attendant deceptions and cover-ups.277 Its orientation had distinctively
disparate racial consequences, none of which favored Black people.
Tolan stands apart from Allen and Harlow and suggests different
conclusions. Five seem warranted. The first one is obvious. On the facts, the
Court corrected a serious and obvious misapplication of the law of summary
judgment.
Second, the Court’s decision highlighted the largely uncabined discretion
that courts enjoy in ruling on motions for summary judgment. It
demonstrated the troubling truth that different individuals view “facts”
differently in terms of whether they are “material” and whether they create
“genuine disputes.” Further, it demonstrated the acute danger in motions for
summary judgment that judicial discretion may allow implicit and
institutional racial biases to influence or control the results. The Court’s
decision in Tolan should serve as a serious caution to lower courts when they
consider those motions.
Third, the Court’s opinion failed to address the underlying substantive
legal question that Tolan raised so dramatically. When police actions lead to
See text supra at notes 60-61.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
See, e.g., sources cited in Section III.A, supra.
Barry Wright, Civilianising the ‘Blue Code’? An Examination of Attitudes to Misconduct in the
Police Extended Family, 12 INT’L. J. POLICE SCI & MGMT. 339 (2010); Thomas Nolan, Behind the Blue
Wall of Silence: Essay, SAGE J., https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X09334700 (2009); Jerome Skolnick,
Corruption and the Blue Cade of Silence, 3 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 7 (2002); Gabriel J. Chin & Scott
C. Wells, The Blue Wall of Silence as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police
Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1997-1998); THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION TO
INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION
PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, COMMISSION REPORT (1994).
274
275
276
277
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the injury or death of those whom the officers are sworn to protect, just how
many mistakes, misjudgments, provocations, and abuses can they pile on top
of one another and still avoid civil or criminal liability? By authorizing the
courts to focus only on a final, split-second act of police violence, the law
allows the courts to refuse to consider whether and how the police themselves
may have caused needless injuries and deaths. The law should not preclude
accountability so sweepingly for those it authorizes to carry a badge, a
truncheon, and a gun and certainly not in cases like Tolan where the true
“totality of all of the circumstances” points so clearly not only to serial and
egregious police faults but also to the likely influence of racial bias.
Fourth, the Supreme Court’s opinion—focusing narrowly on four specific
fact disputes but passing over the wider range of ways in which the lower
courts misapplied the law and improperly favored the police—illustrates how
“the law” generally finds ways to avoid addressing the issue of racial bias or
hides it behind a facade of technical and abstract reasoning. Absent stark and
weighty evidence on point, courts are loath to consider the possible impact
of racial bias because it so often presents an exceptionally difficult issue to
prove. As a consequence, the law either ignores those issues completely or
tries to deal with them obliquely under the cover of social generalities and
legal formalities. As understandable and perhaps even largely necessary as
that practice may be, it means that the law leaves much open space for implicit
and institutional racial biases to operate.
Finally, and as a ray of hope, the Court’s action may possibly reveal a
dawning, if still faint and inchoate, recognition of the role that racial bias
plays in the actions of police officers and, even more important, the role it
may play in the decisions of the courts themselves. Further, it may also
suggest that some of the Court’s members might be willing to take some small
steps—even if indirect and covered by legal formalisms—in an effort to
reduce its baneful effects. If so, qualifying the causal reasoning in Allen,
modifying Harlow at least in civil rights actions by Black people, and
scrutinizing more rigorously grants of summary judgment for police officers
would be perfect places to start.
In Tolan, the NAACP submitted an amicus brief that called the Court’s
attention to the existence and possible influence of implicit racial bias.278 The
legal errors the lower courts made, the brief argued, were “particularly
problematic where, as here, indicia of racial bias taint the underlying facts.”
More specifically, the brief noted that “the Court of Appeals did not consider
the influence of subconscious stereotypes, falsely associating race with

278 Brief for NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
at 4, 19-25, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (No. 13-551).
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criminality, aggression, and violence.”279 It spent seven pages explaining how
and why “the facts suggest that unconscious bias may have influenced the
actions” of Edwards and Cotton,280 and it cited a number of legal analyses
and psychological studies to show the importance of implicit racial bias and
how it influences human behavior. The brief then urged courts to “scrutinize
for signs of implicit bias where, as here, the evidence prompts ‘suspicion’ that
official decisionmaking was influenced by ‘impermissible assumptions’ or
‘invidious stereotypes’.”281 It concluded specifically that “Sergeant Cotton’s
evaluation of the scene, prompting the use of lethal force in asserted selfdefense, may have been shaped by the implicit biases just described.”282
One could speculate that Tolan was a case where an amicus brief might
have played a pivotal role in a Supreme Court decision.283 Implicit and
institutional racial biases surely seem the most likely explanations for all that
happened that night in the Tolans’ front yard, and it seems reasonable to
speculate that the NAACP’s stress on the role of implicit racial bias may have
lurked behind the decision of the justices to reverse.284 It is hard to fathom
the abuse and violence that occurred in the case or the way the lower courts
exercised their discretion without considering the likely presence of implicit
and institutional racial bias.
Ultimately, then, Tolan, may offer some hope of change. Its reversal of the
summary judgment for the officers suggests that the Court might have inched
toward a recognition of the pervasive influence of implicit and institutional
racial bias and the intrinsic danger of judicial discretion in summary
judgment.285 The four narrow and specific grounds it cited for reversing the
lower courts may have been merely the technical legal tools it found

Id. at 4.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 24 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 464-65 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
282 Id. at 24.
283 On the influence of amicus briefs in the Supreme Court, see generally Paul M. Collins, Jr.,
Pamela C. Corley & Jesse Hamner, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion
Content, 49 L. & SOC. REV. 917 (2015).
284 The Court noted, abstractly but nonetheless pointedly, that “witnesses on both sides come
to this case with their own perceptions, recollections, and even potential biases.” That fact, it
continued, was part of the “reason that genuine disputes are generally resolved by juries in our
adversarial system.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 660 (2014) (per curiam). Then it ruled: “By
weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences contrary to Tolan’s competent evidence, the
court below neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage,
reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id.
285 Conversely, the concurring opinion of Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia, suggested the
contrary. It argued that cases like Tolan, in which the lower courts “invoked the correct standard,”
were “utterly routine” and should not burden the Court’s docket. Id. at 661 (Alito, J., concurring).
279
280
281
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serviceable in seeking to reign in a far more insidious legal practice and a far
more destructive social wrong.
B. The Law in the Real World
The real world significance of Tolan v. Cotton, however, seems far less
promising.
After the Court’s remand, the Fifth Circuit sent the case back to the
district court and to the same trial judge who had dismissed it initially. In a
subsequent proceeding the judge denied Robbie’s efforts to put on additional
witnesses to testify about his beckoning major league baseball career and the
losses he suffered as a result of the shooting. Then the judge refused to recuse
herself and denied Robbie’s motion to compel her removal. Recognizing the
highly unfavorable situation they faced, the Tolans finally surrendered. They
accepted the city’s offer to pay Robbie $110,000 while refusing to admit any
wrongdoing whatsoever.286
The Tolan family was crushed. Robbie went through a long recovery
period of “constant excruciating pain,” saw his promising baseball career
destroyed, and was finally forced by the long physical and legal ordeal to
reluctantly accept a settlement that he knew was unjust.287 Marian grew
increasingly angry and frustrated because she had been committed to
“holding the police responsible for what they did,” and Robbie’s decision to
settle led to a distressing conflict between the two.288 “So our relationship
suffered,” Robbie wrote with anguish.289 For his part, Bobby agonized over
the police intrusion and what had happened to his son that night until, a week
and a half after the shooting, he was rushed to a hospital for double bypass
surgery.290 The family was compelled to give up its home to pay all the legal
fees, and Bobby, a former well-known major league baseball player, was
reduced in his old age to driving a car for Uber in order to support his
family.291

Barajas, supra note 224; Settlement Reached, supra note 127.
TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 44, 224-26. “I lost my career. And I got nothing.
Nothing. Not even an apology.” Id. at 231.
288 Id. at 224-26. “We wouldn’t get a settlement that sent a message to the world that you can’t
just shoot black people when you want and get away with it.” Id. at 226.
289 Id. at 225.
290 Id. at 223; Darcel Rocket, “Aren’t You That Guy That Got Shot”: Victim Talks About Life After
a Police-Involved Shooting, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 10, 2018), http://chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/sc-famrobbie-tolan-no-justice-0227-story.html [https://perma.cc/6B8F-75YJ].
291 TOLAN & ROSS, supra note 128, at 224. “My father,” Robbie wrote, “embodied the hero who
did his best to hold on as his son struggled to find justice, with no guarantee that he’d find it.” Id. at
224.
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Marian captured the family’s agony. “Though I still have my son, I’ve had
to watch his dreams and part of his spirit die,” she grieved. “We’ve given up
so much as a family for a chance at justice, a chance at peace, a chance at being
whole again.” The law allowed the Tolans none of those things. “This,”
Marian lamented, “has been a horrific experience.”292
Sergeant Cotton fared well. He was not reprimanded but rewarded. The
Bellaire Police Department promoted him to lieutenant.293
The trial judge continued to sit on the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas and in 2018 took senior status, a position she
continues to hold. When Robbie had attempted to have her removed from
the case after the remand, she denied his motion and proclaimed that she “has
never expressed a personal bias or prejudice against Robert B. Tolan or in
favor of Jeffrey Cotton.”294 Then, she announced that she was “very tempted
to grant” Cotton’s motion for summary judgment once again and to do so for
the very same reasons she had granted his summary judgment motion three
years earlier. “I have a lot of faith in my [original] opinion,” she boasted to
the courtroom, and “I thought it was right the first time.”295
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